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ABSTRACT 
We argue that New Originalism, which has emerged as the dominant theory of originalism, has a 
significant methodological limitation for anyone who takes historical research seriously.  That 
limitation arises where historical sources indicate different possible original meanings, which can 
occur because of New Originalism’s focus on the meaning of the text for a hypothetical, reasonable 
person at the time of ratification.  We describe the first instance of this problem, which occurred in 
Hylton v. United States (1796).  Hylton involved the constitutionality of an excise tax, and we 
use that case to provide a real example of the impossibility of a New Originalist interpretation 
when the historical materials provide clear evidence of equally plausible but conflicting meanings.  
We suggest that Justice Paterson's opinion in Hylton offers a solution to this problem: where New 
Originalism cannot settle the question of original meaning, judges might turn to Old 
Originalism's focus on the intentions of the Founders. Our article thus makes three significant 
contributions to constitutional scholarship:  (1) it identifies a critical weakness of New 
Originalism; (2) it demonstrates how the Supreme Court in the founding era used Old 
Originalism to resolve this problem; and (3) it represents the most complete analysis of the 
historical meaning of the taxation provisions in Hylton, which may prove to be useful for present 
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INTRODUCTION 
Well before Chief Justice Marshall declared in Marbury v. Madison that “a 
law repugnant to the constitution is void,”1 the Supreme Court had already 
explicitly invoked its power of judicial review to determine the 
constitutionality of a federal statute.  Hylton v. United States concerned the 
constitutionality of a federal tax on carriages.2  The case was trumped up, 
 
 1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).  The line has been perhaps too 
celebrated, given that it was not the first use of judicial review in the United States.  See 
infra note 2.  A notable instance of exaggerated praise for Marbury’s declaration of 
judicial review comes from a breathless passage by Alexander Bickel:  “If any social 
progress can be said to have been ‘done’ at a given time and by a given act, it is Marshall’s 
achievement.  The time was 1803; the act was the decision in the case of Marbury v. 
Madison.”  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962). 
 2 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); see also WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND 
OLIVER ELLSWORTH 104–05 (1995) (discussing the Hylton decision and its immediate 
impact); Robert P. Frankel, Jr., Before Marbury:  Hylton v. United States and the Origins of 
 
Apr. 2013] LIMITS OF NEW ORIGINALISM 1163 
 
the facts were bogus, the procedure was defective, and the Court lacked a 
quorum.3  The purpose of the case was to establish the limits—if any—of the 
federal taxing power, and both sides looked to the Supreme Court to 
provide the final answer.  This resort to the judicial process was especially 
noteworthy since fresh in everyone’s mind was the most recent dispute over 
federal taxation—the Whiskey Rebellion.4  It must have been a relief to the 
government that three Justices, rather than 15,000 men from the militia, 
were able to settle the constitutional issue in Hylton. 
The decision in Hylton is best known as an unabashed defense of 
Hamiltonian Nationalism,5 but it may be far more important for its lessons 
in originalism.  With no clear precedents either on the tax issue itself or, 
more importantly, on how judicial review should be done, the advocates in 
the case—essentially Hamiltonian Nationalists, including Hamilton himself, 
for the government, versus James Madison and a host of states’ rights-
focused Virginians—battled over how to interpret the Constitution. 
Remarkably, the issues presented and the positions taken sound 
surprisingly modern—textual analysis, historical context, dictionary 
 
Judicial Review, 28 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 1, 2 (2003) (“Hylton v. United States . . . stands as 
the most conspicuous example of the Supreme Court’s use of judicial review prior to 
Marbury.”); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 
541 (2005) (“[Hylton was] the only case [before Marbury] in which the Court decided 
whether a substantive congressional statute (as opposed to a congressional statute 
concerned with jurisdiction) ran afoul of the Constitution.”); Keith E. Whittington, 
Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1276–77 (2009) (“Hylton v. 
United States was the first reported case of Supreme Court review of a federal statute 
passed under the authority of the U.S. Constitution.”). 
 3 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:  THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS, 1789–1888, at 32 (1985) (describing these and other defects in the case). 
 4 See generally WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION:  GEORGE WASHINGTON, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA’S 
NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY (2006) (presenting the struggle between government and 
citizen during the Whiskey Rebellion); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION:  
FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986) (comparing the parallels 
between the struggle over taxation and representation during the American Revolution 
and the Whiskey Rebellion); THE WHISKEY REBELLION:  PAST AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES 
(Steven R. Boyd ed., 1985) (giving readers a collection of scholarship regarding the 
Whiskey Rebellion). 
 5 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20–23 
(1999).  Ackerman notes, in referring to the most extensive opinion, written by Justice 
Paterson, “[w]ith this powerful prose, our leading states’ rights Founder joined his 
nationalizing associates” in upholding the federal tax.  Id. at 23; see also Erik M. Jensen, 
The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”:  Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?  97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2334, 2351 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Direct Taxes] (“[T]he reasoning in the several 
Hylton opinions does not deserve the reverence it is so often shown . . . the Justices relied 
excessively on the imaginative, but misleading, arguments of Alexander Hamilton.”); Erik 
M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution:  How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL. 
687, 695 n.35 (1999) [hereinafter Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution] (“The [Hylton] 
Justices’ task, as they understood it, was to support the Federalist government . . . .”). 
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definitions, political and economic philosophy, Framers’ intentions, and the 
like.  In the end, we see a number of distinguished Framers on both sides 
sounding a great deal like twenty-first-century textualists, or “New 
Originalists.”  More importantly, we can see why it made sense for the 
Supreme Court to opt for classic, intent-based “Old Originalism” instead.  
Hylton thus highlights a significant practical weakness inherent in the 
perhaps theoretically more powerful New Originalism—that is, how to 
interpret a constitutional text when there are two or more equally persuasive 
original public meanings.  Seeing how the Justices in Hylton resolved this 
issue by focusing on the nature of the negotiations that took place at the 
Constitutional Convention provides important insights into the merits of 
Old Originalism. 
There is a rapidly increasing literature describing the various 
permutations of originalism, especially since, in Jeffrey Shulman’s recent 
words, “[i]t is said that we are all originalists now.”6  There are quite a few 
good summaries of the numerous approaches to discerning the original 
“intent,” “meaning,” or “understanding” of constitutional provisions, 
variously referred to as Old Originalism, New Originalism, and New New 
Originalism, in Peter Smith’s recent nomenclature.7  Generally speaking 
(and for reasons too theoretically complex to be detailed here), Old 
Originalism, or what we sometimes call “Originalism Classic,” focuses 
primarily on the intentions of the Framers in enacting a particular 
provision;8 New Originalism seeks instead what a “hypothetical reasonably 
 
 6 Jeffrey Shulman, The Siren Song of History:  Originalism and the Religion Clauses, 27 J.L. & 
RELIGION 163, 163 (2011) (book review). 
 7 Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 
707–08, 725 (2011).  For a history of constitutional originalism, see generally JOHNATHAN 
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS:  A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
(2005).  See also Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism?  The Evolution of Contemporary 
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 12, 12 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (“The aim of this 
chapter is to clarify these debates by providing a history of contemporary originalism and 
then developing an account of the core or focal content of originalist theory.”); Jamal 
Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 674–82 (2009) (offering a brief history of 
originalism); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134–48 (2003) (providing a history 
of modern originalism); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599 (2004) (focusing on the developments in constitutional theory regarding Old 
and New Originalism). 
 8 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–73 (1977) (defending the importance of “original 
intention”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 17 (1971) (“The first [approach] is to take from the document rather specific 
values that the text or history show the framers actually to have intended and which are 
capable of being translated into principled rules.”); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a 
Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976) (“Where the framers of the 
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well-informed Ratifier would have objectively understood the legal text to 
mean with all of the relevant information in hand;”9 and the New New 
Originalists “claim that some provisions of the Constitution ought to be 
interpreted at a high level of generality, and that even originalist 
interpretation often requires courts to engage in creative and political acts 
of construction in the formulation of legal rules.”10 
 
Constitution have used general language, they have given latitude to those who would 
later interpret the instrument to make that language applicable to cases that the framers 
might not have foreseen.”).  Whether Judge Bork favored intentionalism is not entirely 
clear from his 1971 article, and he later took the position that the language used by the 
Framers was “a shorthand formulation” for the original public meaning of the text.  
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 
(1990).  However, scholars have suggested that Judge Bork’s original position was much 
closer to Raoul Berger’s and other intentionalists’, who located original intent in the 
debates of the Constitutional Convention and the writings of the Founders.  See Mitchell 
N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (“The first wave of 
contemporary originalists, led in the 1970s by then-Professor Robert Bork and Raoul 
Berger . . . advocate[ed] that courts focus on the original intent of the framers.”); 
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248 (2009) 
(“When scholars like Raoul Berger and Robert Bork . . . began to compose scholarly 
monographs articulating an intellectual defense of originalism . . . they repeated and 
developed the notion that the proper meaning of the Constitution is the meaning 
originally intended by the Framers.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, Illinois 
Public Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 14 (Nov. 22, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 (“Bork, Rehnquist, Berger, and Meese 
implicitly endorsed what we now call ‘original intentions originalism,’ the view that 
constitutional interpretation should be guided by the original intentions of the 
framers.”). 
 9 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1162; see also, John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role 
of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1341–42 
(1998) (“Even if we cannot know the actual intent of the legislature, we can at least 
charge each legislator with the intention ‘to say what one would be normally understood 
as saying, given the circumstances in which one said it.’  Ascribing that sort of objectified 
intent to legislators offers an intelligible way to hold legislators accountable for the laws 
they have passed, whether or not they have any actual intent, singly or collectively, 
respecting its details.  Textualists subscribe to this theory of intent.”) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW:  ESSAYS ON 
LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).  Some might include Randy 
Barnett in this category of scholars as well, given his emphasis on the public, semantic 
meaning of the constitutional text.  See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) (“It cannot be overstressed that the activity of 
determining semantic meaning at the time of enactment required by the first proposition 
is empirical, not normative.  Although we can choose to use words however we wish, as 
Alice discovered in Wonderland, the social or interpersonal linguistic meaning of words 
is an empirical fact beyond the will or control of any given speaker (which was the point 
being made by Alice in Wonderland’s author).  Although the objective meaning of words 
sometimes evolves, words have an objective social meaning at any given time that is 
independent of our opinions of that meaning, and this meaning can typically be 
discovered by empirical investigation.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 10 Smith, supra note 7, at 718 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing as examples of New New Originalists, among others, Jack M. Balkin, Original 
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The principal division between Old and New Originalists is whether the 
Framers’ subjective intentions in enacting a particular provision represent 
the Constitution’s meaning, or whether instead courts should look to the 
objective meaning of the text itself.  The modern (Old) Originalist 
movement is generally seen as springing from a 1971 law review article by 
Robert Bork,11 with a valuable assist from Attorney General Meese’s call in 
1985 for a “jurisprudence of original intention.”12  New Originalism is most 
commonly associated with Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and his 
fellow “textualists.”13  In the transition from an originalism of original intent 
to one of original public meaning, the initial stimulus is typically credited to 
Paul Brest.  In 1980, Brest argued that “there may be instances where a 
framer had a determinate intent but other adopters had no intent or an 
indeterminate intent,” posing the so-called “summing” problem of how to 
reconcile conflicting or indeterminate intentions.14  He also pointed out the 
sticky issue of deciding the level of generality at which the original intention 
 
Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007); Randy E. 
Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999)).  Whether this “New 
New Originalism” may appropriately be termed “originalism” is contestable.  See, e.g., 
David A. Strauss, Can Originalism be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1163–67 (2012) 
(questioning whether Balkin’s “living originalist” scholarship can properly be deemed 
originalism). 
 11 Bork, supra note 8.  The standard accounts of the development of originalism tend to cite 
Bork’s article as the launch pad of modern originalism.  See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 
7, at 600–02; Solum, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
 12 Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States:  Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 
S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986) (emphasis omitted). 
 13 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION]. 
 14 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 214 
(1980); see also id. at 214–15 (“[In cases] where a framer had a determinate intent but 
other adopters had no intent or an indeterminate intent, . . . the institutional intent is 
ambiguous.  One adopter might wish his indeterminate intent to be treated as ‘no 
intent.’  Another adopter might wish to delegate his intention-vote to those whose intent 
is determinate.  Yet another might wish to delegate authority to decisionmakers charged 
with applying the provision in the future.  Without knowing more about the mind-sets of 
the actual adopters of particular constitutional provisions, one would be hard-pressed to 
choose among these.”).  This skepticism of group intent in the constitutional context was 
an echo of Max Radin’s earlier realist critiques of legislative intent in the statutory realm.  
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 642 (1990) (“To talk about the 
collective intent of a legislature is fiction compounded, not just by the greater number of 
people whose intent must be discovered, but also by the muteness of most of these people 
and the special conventions of the legislative process, such as the requirements that a bill 
must be passed in the same form by both chambers (bicameralism) and that it must then 
be presented to the President (presentment).  Radin showed that one can deconstruct 
almost any legislative intent argument through predictable analytical moves.  This insight 
has been revived by several newer legal process theorists in the 1980s.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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is to be reconstructed.15  Just how specific were the original intentions of the 
Framers, and how strong is our evidence of those intentions?  Indeed, how 
can we be sure that the Founders did not intend to delegate the meaning of 
certain constitutional provisions to future interpreters?16 
Often left out of descriptions of Brest’s article is the fact that he also 
anticipated the second major argument against original-intent Old 
Originalism that would emerge in the 1980s:  that the Founders themselves 
did not intend for their intentions to be the basis for discovering 
constitutional meaning.17  This was the basis for H. Jefferson Powell’s 
historical critique of original-intent originalism in 1985.  Powell examined 
the history of interpretation in the Anglo-American context, looking at 
Protestant biblical exegesis,18 the common law tradition,19 the ratification 
debates,20 and the early statements about interpretations of the 
Constitution.21  He concluded that the Framers “shared the traditional 
common law view . . . that the import of the document they were framing 
would be determined by reference to the intrinsic meaning of its words or 
through the usual judicial process of case-by-case interpretation.”22  They 
rejected, in other words, the idea that “future interpreters could avoid 
misconstruing the text by consulting evidence of the intentions articulated 
at the convention.”23  A real dilemma seemed to emerge for original-intent 
Originalists:  the original intent was against the use of original intent.24  At 
this point, in 1986, Justice Antonin Scalia stepped forward with a proposal 
that seemed to overcome these objections.  Suggesting that Originalists 
 
 15 See Brest, supra note 14, at 220, 223–24. 
 16 See id. at 216–17.  Whittington provides a helpful list of later responses to Brest’s 
arguments.  See Whittington, supra note 7, at 605 nn.32–33; see also Richard S. Kay, 
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 
708 (2009). 
 17 Brest, supra note 14, at 215–16; see also  Solum, supra note 8, at 15. 
 18 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 
889–94 (1985). 
 19 Id. at 894–902. 
 20 Id. at 902–13. 
 21 Id. at 913–24. 
 22 Id. at 903–04 (footnote omitted). 
 23 Id. at 903. 
 24 For responses, see Whittington, supra note 7, at 605 n.34.  Powell’s article touched off a 
lively debate with Raoul Berger, who rose to intentionalism’s defense.  See Raoul Berger, 
The Founders’ Views—According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1055–80 (1988) 
(taking issue with the characterization of Berger’s book, FEDERALISM:  THE FOUNDERS’ 
DESIGN (1987), in a review written by Powell); Raoul Berger, “Original Intention” in 
Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296, 296–97 (1986) (disputing Powell’s 
historical account of the roots of the doctrine of original intention and reaffirming 
intentionalism); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1531–42 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM:  THE 
FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)). 
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“change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of 
Original Meaning,”25 Scalia shifted the purpose of the originalist inquiry 
from one interested in the subjective intentions of the Founders to one 
seeking the meaning of the Constitution’s words as understood in their 
original public context.  As Scalia later elaborated:  “What I look for in the 
Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute:  the original meaning of 
the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”26 
 
 25 Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic 
Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE:  A 
SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (Mar. 12, 1987). 
 26 SCALIA, supra note 13, at 38.  As this quotation indicates, Scalia’s interpretive mode in the 
constitutional area is consistent with the textualist approach for which he has advocated 
in the statutory context.  See Eskridge, supra note 14, at 650–56.  Indeed, when one 
observes that New Originalism developed and emerged just as New Textualism was 
beginning to take flight in the courts and scholarship, see id. (describing the emergence 
of New Textualism in the 1980s), it is hard to resist the conclusion that New Originalism 
is in many ways a byproduct of the intellectual environment created by the rise of New 
Textualism.  This is even more apparent when one considers that many of the critiques of 
legislative history that motivated the birth of New Textualism also drove the creation of 
New Originalism.  Just as the group-intentionalist premises of purposivism in the statutory 
context came under realist critiques from Max Radin, see id. at 642, Old Originalism’s 
focus on original intent was rejected by Paul Brest on similarly realist grounds.  See Brest, 
supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.  Likewise, New Textualism views the use of 
legislative history as largely illegitimate because it fails to take account of the views of the 
entire legislative body responsible for enacting the text.  See Eskridge, supra note 14, at 
642–44 (identifying ways in which legislative history may provide a distorted picture of the 
views of the legislative body as a whole); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 676 (1997) (“[A]uthoritative legislative history makes it 
far too attractive for legislators to bypass the constitutionally proscribed process of 
bicameralism and presentment.  By using legislative history as an authoritative source of 
legislative intent, the Court makes legislative self-delegation possible; Congress’s own 
agents can go far in determining the details of statutory meaning simply by declaring 
their own conception of legislative intent.”).  Moreover, New Originalism focuses on the 
public meaning because those who attended the Constitutional Convention were not the 
ones who ultimately ratified and conferred authority on the new Constitution.  See 
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1137 (“The shift to original understanding was part of 
an increased recognition that it was the action of the Constitution’s Ratifiers—state 
ratifying conventions in the case of the original document and state legislatures in the 
case of the amendments—whose actions gave legal life to the otherwise dead words on 
paper drafted by the Philadelphia Convention and the Congresses proposing the 
amendments.”).  These concerns about interpretive theory—shared by New Originalism 
and New Textualism alike—lead to similar methodologies:  a focus on the meaning of the 
text as understood using the linguistic conventions extant at the time of the text’s 
adoption.  Compare id. at 1132 (“[Originalism] is in reference to the original, non-
idiosyncratic meaning of words and phrases in the Constitution:  how the  words and 
phrases, and structure (and sometimes even the punctuation marks!) would have been 
understood by a hypothetical,  objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words 
and phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and within the political and 
linguistic community in which they were adopted.” (footnotes omitted)), with John F. 
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79–80 (2006) 
(“‘Textualists thus look for what they call ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a 
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Our goal is not to rehash the arguments against Old Originalism—other 
than to point out that Hylton suggests that they may be overstated—or to 
attempt finally to settle this ongoing debate.  Rather, we point out that, 
while the New Originalists have made a number of theoretical arguments for 
the superiority of seeking the objective meaning of the constitutional text, 
there are practical impediments to doing so, and Old Originalism may be 
able to help.  The issue is:  what to do when the evidence of textual meaning 
points in two opposite directions?27 
We conclude, based on our analysis of the Hylton case, that the Justices 
had good cause to trump the various New Originalist-like approaches 
advanced by the parties with its eighteenth-century version of Really Old 
Originalism—that is, to invoke the intentions of the Framers to interpret the 
Constitution, rather than the perfectly good, but contradictory, analyses of 
the objective meaning of the text that resulted from referring to dictionary 
definitions, legal commentaries, and the other kinds of sources on which 
New Originalists typically rely.  Moreover, the methodological challenges to 
ascertaining clear, objective readings of constitutional texts that are exposed 
in Hylton are not limited to that case’s otherwise obscure carriage tax 
 
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder 
of the corpus juris.’  Because one can make sense of others’ communications only by 
placing them in their appropriate social and linguistic context, textualists further 
acknowledge that ‘[i]n textual interpretation, context is everything.’” (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting SCALIA, supra note 13, at 17, 37)). 
 27 In defense of intentionalism, Richard Kay points out that, in some cases, New Originalism 
will produce conflicting original public meanings, and a court would have to “find some 
way—apart from considering the intended meaning—to decide which of two proffered 
meanings is more probably the correct public meaning.”  Kay, supra note 16, at 719–20.  
Kay believes that the disagreements about original public meaning will typically be about 
“the precise scope” of the contested constitutional provision.  Id. at 719.  We agree with 
Kay’s observation of the problem of divergent original public meanings, but we believe 
that the issue may be significantly broader than one of scope and might instead go to the 
very essence of what the provision means.  Meanwhile, Professor Solum seeks to minimize 
(or erase) the difference between New and Old Originalists by positing that it “is possible 
for intended meaning and public meaning to diverge, but in the case of a legal text, such 
divergence will be rare in practice.”  Solum, supra note 7, at 38.  He bases this conclusion 
on the grounds that the 
authors of the constitutional text knew that those who would read and interpret 
the text would have limited access to information about idiosyncratic semantic 
intentions:  For example, the records of the Philadelphia Convention and the 
ratifying conventions were not publicly available in the era that immediately 
followed ratification.  For this reason, the semantic intentions of the ratifiers are 
likely to closely track original public meaning . . . . 
  Id.  For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Solum that “[o]riginalist theory must 
account for linguistic facts on the ground,” but we believe that those facts—examined on 
a case-by-case basis—will show not only that intended meaning and public meaning may 
differ, but also that equally strong semantic arguments can be employed to lead to 
different public meanings (and that such occasions may not, in fact, be as rare as he 
suggests).  Id. 
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dispute.  The same difficulties appear when various other high-profile 
constitutional issues are raised, including the ever-controversial church-state 
arena,28 leading to the question of whether New Originalism may be far 
more interesting in theory than in practice. 
I.  THE CARRIAGE TAX, ARTICLE I, AND ORIGINALISM 
A.  The Hylton Case 
In 1794, the new country was fighting the Indians in the Northwest 
Territory, and, at the same time, American trading ships were being seized 
by the British in the Atlantic.29  The government urgently needed to raise 
funds for the national defense, and the congressional Ways and Means 
Committee issued a report proposing a variety of “customs duties on 
specified articles, additional tonnage duties, a stamp tax, increased excise 
taxes on sales at auction and on tobacco, snuff and sugar[,] . . . a license fee 
for the sale of foreign distilled liquors and wines” and a carriage tax.30  As 
Madison wrote at the time to Jefferson, these “items [were] copied as usual 
from the British Revenue laws,” thanks to the influence of Hamilton’s “Fiscal 
Department.”31  The Congress proceeded to enact a number of the 
proposed taxes, including the tax on carriages, which called for “duties and 
rates” on carriages “kept by or for any person, for his or her own use, or to 
be let out to hire, or for the conveyance of passengers.”32 
The constitutional issue surrounding the carriage tax would arise under 
Article I, Sections 2 and 8, which give Congress “power to lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the 
 
 28 See infra Part III. 
 29 See generally WILEY SWORD, PRESIDENT WASHINGTON’S INDIAN WAR:  THE STRUGGLE FOR 
THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1790–1795 (1985); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 603 (Edward G. Gray & Jane Kamensky eds., 2013). 
 30 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:  DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 299 
(Julius Goebel, Jr. & Joseph H. Smith eds., 1980) [hereinafter 4 LAW PRACTICE OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON]. 
 31 Id. at 299–300 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1794), 
in 17 JAMES MADISON PAPERS 64 (Library of Congress), available at 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/collections/madison_papers/index.html).  Attorney 
General Bradford also indicated that “it was Hamilton who fathered the proposal of the 
1794 carriage tax.”  Id. at 300 (citing Letter from William Bradford to Alexander 
Hamilton (July 2, 1795), in 18 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 393 (Harold C. Syrett, 
ed. 1961)). 
 32 Id. at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting An Act laying duties upon 
Carriages for the conveyance of Persons, 1 Stat. 373, 374 (repealed 1802)); see also An Act 
laying duties upon Carriages for the conveyance of Persons, 1 Stat. 373–375 (repealed 
1802). 
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common defense and general welfare . . . .”33  Both representation in 
Congress and “direct Taxes” must be “apportioned among the several 
States,”34 whereas “all Duties, Imposts, and Excises” need only be “uniform 
throughout the United States.”35  These less-than-transparent provisions led 
to the primary constitutional question about the carriage tax:  Was it a 
“direct tax” that needed to be “apportioned,” that is, proportional to how 
the various states were represented in Congress?36  Alternatively, was it 
perhaps an excise tax that only needed to be uniform throughout the 
country?  These issues focused the arguments on crucial issues for 
originalists:  First, where to look for definitions of important constitutional 
terms such as “direct Taxes” or “excises;” and, second, what to do when, as 
will be seen in this case, the best evidence of contemporary usage points in 
two different directions?  In such cases, can the history of the formation of 
the Constitution—and, in particular, the nature of the debates at the 
Convention and the delegates’ negotiations over various provisions—solve 
this problem by providing a definitive reading of the text? 
1.  Framers v. Framers 
The facts in the Hylton case were simple, largely because they were 
invented.  As set out in Justice Paterson’s opinion (without any hint that he 
was just playing along), Hylton owned “one hundred and twenty-five chariots 
for the conveyance of persons, but exclusively for his own separate use, and 
not to let out to hire, or for the conveyance of persons for hire.”37  Hylton 
was a successful businessman in Virginia, although not, as far as we know, an 
avid chariot collector.38  Hylton seems to have owned at least one carriage, 
and he refused to pay the tax, as did a number of other prominent 
Virginians who believed that the greater prevalence of carriages in the south 
than in the north made the tax inequitable.  As Virginia jurist St. George 
Tucker wrote to James Monroe, “[a] friend of yours in this place 
[Williamsburg] refused to pay the carriage tax, upon the ground that it was 
a direct tax, & not imposed according to the Constitution.  So did Mr. 
 
33  U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2, 8. 
 34 Id. at § 2, cl. 3. 
 35 Id. at § 8, cl. 1. 
 36 For a discussion of the requirement of apportionment as “a botch in the core of the 
Constitution,” see Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes:  The Foul-Up in the Core 
of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 11 (1998). 
 37 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176 (1796). 
 38 It has been noted that the number of carriages allegedly owned by Hylton was greater 
“than then existed in Virginia.”  Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 
20 HARV. L. REV. 280, 283 n.1 (1907). 
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Pendleton, Mr. Roan, Col Taylor, Mr. Page & some others.”39  This was a 
distinguished group:  Edmund Pendleton was the President of the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals, and John Page was a member of the Congress 
who had adopted the tax.40  Hamilton and Attorney General Bradford then 
sought a way to combat this early example of civil disobedience, and they 
decided that the best course would be to secure a judgment of the Supreme 
Court as to the constitutionality of the carriage tax.41 
Legal historian Julius Goebel has provided a detailed and fascinating 
documentary history of this case.  As Goebel notes, the nature of the 
carriage tax made it nearly impossible for the case to find its way to the 
Supreme Court.42  The 1789 Judiciary Act provided for appeal to the 
Supreme Court only where the amount in controversy exceeded $2000, but 
the contested taxes were just a few dollars per carriage.43  It would therefore 
be necessary to obtain “an arrangement by mutual consent,” in Hamilton’s 
words, since only a Supreme Court decision would “produce the 
acquiescence of the Executive in a determination agreeable to the hopes of 
the Defendants.”44  And so, Hylton, who had been a client of Hamilton’s law 
practice a few years earlier,45 agreed to be sued for failing to pay $1000 in 
taxes on 125 chariots, which subjected him to a fine of an additional $1000, 
thus reaching—but not exceeding—the $2000 statutory threshold for suit 
 
 39 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 309 (quoting Letter from St. 
George Tucker to James Monroe (Mar. 8, 1795) (in ms. James Monroe Papers, at the Earl 
Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia).  Goebel has 
discovered an interesting letter on this point from the Supervisor of the Revenue for 
Virginia, Edward Carrington, to Tench Coxe, the federal commissioner of revenue: 
A very general idea prevails in this district, that the act is unconstitutional, and 
numbers of very respectable Characters have signified their determination to try 
the point by legal decision.  This circumstance renders it of material consequence, 
that the Officers should proceed strictly under . . . the Act, that, in a legal contest, 
there may be no confusion of principles, and a decision may turn fairly on the 
constitutionality of the Act . . . . 
  Id. at 308–09 (quoting Extract of a letter from the Supervisor of Virginia to the 
Commissioner of the Revenue (July 28, 1794), in 17 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 2 
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961)).  In light of the Whiskey Rebellion, it must have been 
comforting that Carrington noted that it would only be a “pacific, or what will be called a 
legal, opposition” to the carriage tax.  Id. at 308 (quoting Extract of a letter from the 
Supervisor of Virginia to the Commissioner of the Revenue, July 28, 1794, in 17 PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 2 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961)). 
 40 Id. at 309 n.51. 
 41 Id. at 310–11. 
 42 Id. at 311. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 312 (quoting Draft Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, to 
Tench Coxe, Commissioner of the Revenue, Jan. 28, 1795, in id. at 340–42). 
 45 Id. at 330 n.114. 
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under the Judiciary Act of 1789.46  It was further agreed that if Hylton lost 
the case, he could satisfy the judgment by the payment of the tax and 
penalty on the one carriage that he was likely to have actually owned, i.e., 
sixteen dollars.47 
The cast of characters in this constitutional drama should be enough to 
give any originalist pause.  Coming down on one side of the interpretive 
issue are:  Federalist author and Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander 
Hamilton;48 Senator, Supreme Court Justice, and author of the small-states-
focused New Jersey Plan for the Constitution, William Paterson;49 and the 
second-most active speechmaker at the Convention, and Supreme Court 
Justice, James Wilson.50  On the other side:  Federalist author, “Father of the 
Constitution,” and Congressman, James Madison, who argued against the 
law’s constitutionality when it was proposed in Congress;51 a member of the 
first three United States Congresses, including the one that passed the 
carriage tax, John Page;52 and the President of Virginia’s constitutional 
ratifying convention, Edmund Pendleton, who had been appointed to a 
federal judgeship by President Washington (which Pendleton declined).53  
From an Old Originalist perspective, it is noteworthy that several of these 
men were actual Framers—four of them were among the most prominent of 
the fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional Convention, and all of them 
were elected or appointed to positions in the new national government.54  
For New Originalists, the writings of these prominent lawyers, legislators and 
statesmen provide valuable evidence of contemporary language usage and 
meaning with respect to the public meaning of the text. 
Not only were influential Framers involved in the case, but topics of 
taxation and representation were also of particular concern in the formation 
of the Constitution.  One of the principal reasons for adopting a new 
Constitution was to enable the United States government to raise the funds 
 
 46 As Goebel points out, it “is curious that . . . it did not occur to the Attorney General or 
Hamilton” or any of the Justices, “that the sum sued for must be set at a figure in excess of 
$2000.”  Id. at 313. 
 47 Id. at 314 (footnote omitted). 
 48 See supra discussion at note 5. 
 49 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)171, 175, 181 (1794) (Paterson, J.) 
 50 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 314. 
 51 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 729–30 (1794) (“Mr. Madison objected to this tax on carriages as an 
unconstitutional tax; and, as an unconstitutional measure, he would vote against it.”). 
 52 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 309 & n.51. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Johnson goes as far as to say that the “extraordinary actors who decided Hylton were the 
Founders, so if the constitutional construction must follow the Founders’ intent, then 
Hylton represented the constitutional mandate.”  Johnson, supra note 36, at 75.  The 
significant issues regarding intentions and meaning that are lurking in Johnson’s 
statement are discussed infra Part II. 
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it needed in light of the manifest failure of the Articles of Confederation to 
provide an adequate mechanism for doing so.55  This question of the federal 
taxing powers, as well as the issue of proportionate representation among 
the various large and small states, was featured not only in speeches at the 
Constitutional Convention but also during the Federalist-Anti-federalist 
debates leading to ratification.56 
One of the most interesting—and challenging—aspects of how these 
distinguished Framers divided over the carriage tax question is that both 
sides present very good New Originalist arguments based on a variety of 
historical sources that provide insights into the objective meaning of 
language used in the Founding Era.  In fact, when the two authors of this 
article researched the historical use of one of the relevant constitutional 
terms, we found it difficult to agree on the simple question of whether an 
annual tax on the ownership of an item of personal property, such as a 
carriage, could properly be called an “excise,” much as the advocates in 
Hylton so confidently expressed opposing opinions on that seemingly narrow 
definitional issue.57  A review of the historical evidence of the usage of this 
generally well-known form of tax, as compiled by the participants in the 
carriage tax debate and as supplemented by our own research, will illustrate 
this formidable challenge to New Originalism’s desire to identify a single, or 
even best, objective meaning of a constitutional text. 
2.  Definition v. Definition:  Contrasting Meanings of Direct and Excise 
Taxes 
In the Federal Circuit Court, Hylton was heard by Supreme Court Justice 
James Wilson and District Judge Cyrus Griffin.58  Prominent Virginia lawyer 
John Wickham was retained to represent the government, and Hylton’s 
 
 55 Historian Gordon Wood has written, for example, “[t]here were . . . many defects in the 
Articles of Confederation that had become obvious by the 1780s.  Lacking the powers to 
tax and to regulate the nation’s commerce, the Confederation Congress could neither 
pay off the debts the United States had incurred during the Revolution nor retaliate 
against the mercantilist trade policies of the European states, particularly Great Britain.”  
GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY:  A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 
15 (2009). 
 56 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 57 One of us has provided an overview of his understanding of excise elsewhere.  Joel Alicea, 
Obamacare and the Excise Tax, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/245270/obamacare-and-excise-tax-joel-alicea.  
That author no longer believes the original meaning of the excise is as clear as he 
claimed it is in that article.  Nonetheless, he continues to think that the scope of the 
excise taxation power cannot plausibly be stretched to encompass the penalty imposed 
for the non-purchase of health insurance under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010. 
 58 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 314. 
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counsel was John Taylor of Caroline, described by Goebel as “an ardent 
Republican” and a “spokesman for state rights and agrarian liberalism.”59  
The court was divided, with Justice Wilson voting for the constitutionality of 
the tax and Judge Griffin against.60  We were unable to find a record of the 
judges’ opinions, but both Taylor and Wickham published their arguments 
in pamphlet form.61 
Taylor’s argument was far more polemical (and much longer) than 
Wickham’s.62  His goal was to demonstrate that the carriage tax was a direct 
tax, and, therefore unconstitutional for not being apportioned.63  To make 
this argument successfully, he needed to show that it was not an “excise” or 
other form of indirect tax.  He begins with a brief defense of judicial review:  
“the Constitution . . . was designed to preserve certain rights against the 
aggression of [legislative] majorities . . . . It interposes the judiciary between 
the government and the individual.”64  Because the “Constitution is superior 
to the law of any legislative majority,” sometimes “a recurrence to the 
judiciary becomes necessary to ascertain limits, a strict observance of which 
can only . . . preserve the union.”65  Having thus established a rationale for 
the judiciary to declare a law unconstitutional, Taylor then moves to the 
specific issue, viz., if Congress has the power “to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts and excises,” can it “impose the tax upon carriages kept by a citizen 
for his own use?”66  Taylor’s main point is based on the constitutional linkage 
between “direct” taxation and representation.  That is, the inhabitants of 
each state should bear taxes in the same proportion that they are 
represented in Congress.  Echoing Revolutionary themes of taxation without 
 
 59 Id. at 313 & n.62; see also GARRETT WARD SHELDON & C. WILLIAM HILL, JR., THE LIBERAL 
REPUBLICANISM OF JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE (2008). 
 60 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 314. 
 61 See JOHN TAYLOR, AN ARGUMENT RESPECTING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CARRIAGE 
TAX; WHICH SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED AT RICHMOND, IN VIRGINIA, IN MAY, 1795 (1795); 
JOHN WICKHAM, THE SUBSTANCE OF AN ARGUMENT IN THE CASE OF THE CARRIAGE DUTIES, 
DELIVERED BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN VIRGINIA, MAY TERM, 
1795 (1795). 
 62 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 316.  It was also much harder to follow.  As 
Goebel writes, “It is difficult to render a manageable and meaningful account of Taylor’s 
composition, for his method entailed tedious repetition.  One is disposed to agree with 
John Randolph’s vitriolic comment on another Taylor pamphlet:  ‘For heaven’s sake, get 
some worthy person to do the second edition into English.’”  Id. at 317 (quoting EUGENE 
TENBROEK MUDGE, THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE:  A STUDY IN 
JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 2 (1939)). 
 63 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 317–19. 
 64 TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 4. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
1176 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
representation, Taylor continually returns to this “sacred principle” 
throughout his lengthy brief.67 
Blazing a pathway that would later be followed by many New Originalists, 
Taylor starts his analysis with dictionaries:  “In all the glossaries, legal, 
scientific or general to which I have referred, the term excise is expounded to 
mean tribute, and tribute is a tax.”68  Citing in particular “the accurate Mr. 
[Samuel] Johnson,” Taylor defines the word tax as “the genus including all 
government impositions,” and notes that, according to the Constitution, 
“direct taxes” must be apportioned.69  To allow the Congress to call 
something an “excise” or “duty” so as to avoid the apportionment 
requirement “would leave Congress unrestrained upon the subject of 
taxation, in violation of the plainest words.”70  He then summons “Johnson’s 
aid . . . once more” to define the word “direct” as “straight—not crooked—
not oblique.”71  Applying this definition to financial matters, Taylor argued 
that a payment is “straight or direct” if it is made “from the payer to the 
payee,” as opposed to a situation where “a third person [is] interposed 
between the real payer and payee,” which Taylor concludes is “indirect.”72 
A bright line can be drawn between direct and indirect taxes, according 
to Taylor:  “An indirect, is a circulating, a direct, a local tax.”73  That is, an 
indirect tax relates to goods circulating in commerce, and it is collected 
upon sale.  As Taylor puts it, an indirect tax is essentially a sales tax in that it 
is “annexed to articles of traffic [and] . . . can travel from state to state in 
search of an actual payer . . . . [I]n the soothing language of solicitation—
‘will you buy sir, and thus contribute to the revenue.’”74  By contrast, a direct 
tax is “annexed to articles of necessity or convenience, exclusively produced 
and needed by particular soils and climates, [and] cannot circulate.”75  The 
“striking distinction,” for Taylor, is “the voluntary quality of an indirect tax.”76  
Indirect taxes could not be apportioned because, “like a circulating 
medium, [they are] itinerant.  The commodities to which [an indirect tax] 
must be attached, could not be traced throughout the . . . United States, to 
 
 67 Id. at 11–12. 
 68 Id. at 4. 
 69 See id. at 5 (“‘No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the 
census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.’ . . . Words, more 
comprehensive than ‘other direct tax,’ could not have been furnished by our language.  
‘Tax’ the genus including all governmental impositions.  Expounded by the accurate Mr. 
Johnson to mean ‘an impost—a tribute—an excise.’”). 
 70 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 71 Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 10. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 11. 
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the place of their consumption, which is the real place of payment.”77  The 
issue, thus, is not what a tax is called—excise, duty or otherwise—but 
whether it is direct or indirect.  Otherwise, the constitutional text would 
have read, “Direct taxes shall be apportioned—except they be called duties, 
imposts or excises, in which case they shall be uniform only . . . .”78  But, 
instead, “direct taxation was unexceptionably and indissolubly linked with 
representation”:  it “did not escape the notice of the most humble advocate 
for the adoption of the constitution, much less of the celebrated author of 
the Federalist.”79 
One definitional challenge confronting Taylor was that carriage taxes 
were called excises in England, where, Taylor asserts that the excise had 
“mingled its poison with almost every human enjoyment.”80  Citing a variety 
of English statutes, Taylor lists over a hundred excised items, from beer, ale, 
and cider, to soldiers, sailors, and servants.81  If the constitutional term were 
to be interpreted solely in light of “the English practice,” the items 
susceptible of being excised would soon collapse from this long list and 
“shrink to two words—namely—every thing.”82  Such an extremely broad 
definition of the term “excise” could not have been fully embraced in the 
United States Constitution because, in England, a capitation tax was called 
an “excise,” whereas the Constitution expressly describes it as a direct tax.83  
Thus, while acknowledging (and documenting) the history of the broad 
language of taxation in England, Taylor concludes that the “oppressive 
conduct of the British government, in the use of an excise, cannot surely be 
exhibited as an example for our imitation, because . . . Britain has no 
Constitution restrictive of her government” and because this very kind of 
disproportionate taxation in England “suggested to America, the caution 
exhibited in her[ ] [Constitution].”84 
The Framers must have had a different view, writes Taylor:  “If those who 
entered into the compact did not hunt after the various meanings of every 
word, nor trace the progress of the excise through . . . British statute law,” 
then it is not an “improbable conjecture, that the term ‘duties’” was 
 
 77 Id. at 12. 
 78 Id. at 11. 
 79 Id. (emphasis omitted).  It is unclear to which author of THE FEDERALIST Taylor was 
referring.  See infra notes 230–36 and accompanying text. 
 80 TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 8. 
 81 Id. (“[T]his catalogue is probably far short of the real number of articles excised in 
England, as I have had no opportunity of referring to the acts of parliament passed 
during the greater part of the reigns of Geo. 2d & Geo. 3d[,] an era prolific in taxes.”). 
 82 Id. at 14–15. 
 83 Id. at 9; U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be 
laid . . . .”). 
 84 TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 9. 
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considered to be “nearly equivalent to ‘imposts,’ instead of . . . comprising 
every species of tax.”85  Meanwhile, “the idea of ‘excises’ was borrowed from 
the common notion, which did not extend them beyond manufactures 
made for sale.”86  To support these definitions, Taylor first argued that 
“excises, by their being arranged [in the Constitution] with imposts and 
duties,” emphasizes the “political affinity which really exists, between 
imported and internal manufactures . . . for sale.”87  As to “duties,” Taylor 
asserts that the “Constitution is itself the best glossary,”88 an interpretive 
method that leads him to Article I, Section 9, which refers to “a tax or duty” 
on the “importation of slaves,” thus confirming that duties are taxes, and 
that a duty is a “tax upon an imported commodity.”89  And so, a tax on the 
carriages owned by individuals is not an excise or a duty, as those terms are 
used in the Constitution, but an unconstitutional direct tax. 
At this point, though Taylor had reiterated his argument multiple times, 
he was only halfway through his brief.  Virtually all of the remainder, nearly 
10,000 words, is devoted to variations on the theme that “the danger of 
allowing a majority of Congress, to be unencumbered with constitutional 
restrictions” will lead to oppression, and “[i]f oppressed, states will 
combine—the grand divisions of northern and southern will retaliate, as 
majorities or minorities fluctuate—and a retaliation between nations, 
invariably ends in a catastrophe.”90  This threat of a future civil war might be 
called the strong form of Taylor’s argument for the exercise of judicial 
review to strike down this particular federal tax. 
John Wickham, representing the government, also acknowledges the 
Court’s “power . . . to declare an act of the federal legislature null and void,” 
although he does so largely in the pragmatic sense that he would expect to 
lose if he pursued an argument on that “point of much delicacy.”91  He 
observes that “the information [he has] received from the bench” on this 
point is that “though never solemnly decided by the Supreme Court,” it has 
 
 85 Id. at 12. 
 86 Id. at 12–13. 
 87 Id. at 13. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.  Taylor also cites the provision of the same section 
reading, “No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.”  TAYLOR, supra 
note 61, at 13; see also U.S. CONST. art I., § 9, cl. 5. 
 90 TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 16.  Taylor may have had deeper concerns than the effect of the 
carriage tax per se.  He writes: 
Unhappily for the southern states, they possess a species of property, which is 
peculiarly exposed, and upon which, if this law stands, the whole burden of 
government may be exclusively laid.  The English precedent will justify the 
measure, for servants constitute an article in the catalogue of their excises, and an 
American majority exists, who might inflict, without feeling the imposition. 
  Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted). 
 91 WICKHAM, supra note 61, at 15. 
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nevertheless “come before each of the judges in their different circuits, and 
they have all concurred in opinion.”92  Wickham nevertheless seeks to limit 
the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review by arguing that the 
Constitution has empowered Congress to make laws, even if those laws may 
be “neither polite nor just.  Yet if these laws are within the limits of 
[congressional] authority, it belongs not to a co-ordinate branch of the 
government to say they shall not be carried into effect.”93 
Wickham then turns to whether the carriage tax is a “direct tax,” and he, 
too, equips himself with the tools of New Originalism.  This is a well-known 
term, argued Wickham, and “long before the Constitution . . . was framed, a 
tax upon the revenue or income of individuals, was . . . well understood to 
be a direct tax.  A tax upon their expenses, or consumption . . . is an indirect 
tax.”94  Since the carriage tax is “a tax on expense or consumption, [it is] 
therefore an indirect tax.”95  Wickham’s primary support for these “well 
understood” definitions comes from the “partisans of direct taxation in 
France . . . known by the appellation of the Oeconomists,” especially “M. 
Turgot, late Comptroller General of the finances.”96  Because, as Wickham 
argued, customary use has fixed the meaning of the relevant terms, “we must 
presume the framers of the Constitution meant to use [‘direct tax’ and 
‘indirect tax’] in the sense in which [they have] been . . . universally 
understood[.]”97  Here, we see Wickham, as Taylor had argued, assuming 
that the Framers’ intentions were to use the words in their well-understood 
contemporary meanings.  The problem, of course, is that Taylor and 
Wickham advance diametrically opposed “common” or “universal” 
understandings by citing different definitional authorities. 
Taylor’s rejoinder to Wickham’s argument is that “[q]uotations from 
speculative writers . . . [are] entirely without reference to the American 
confederation, which is a social compact sui generis.”98  To understand how 
words are used in the Constitution, it is essential to understand the 
“[v]arious political consequences [that] were mediated by that 
compact, . . . then to discover how far they would be attained or defeated, by 
this or that construction.”99  In this case, it is essential to recognize that the 
“confederation is not a compact of individuals, it is a compact of states”—the 
sacred principle linking taxation and representation.100  The “purpose of the 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 4. 
 94 Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 6, 7. 
 97 Id. at 9. 
 98 Id. at 25–26. 
 99 Id. at 26. 
100 Id. at 28. 
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Constitution,” argued Taylor, is “to bestow upon each state a substantial 
security against oppression by means of any species of taxation.”101  Then, 
after decrying Wickham’s use of external sources, Taylor invokes his own—
namely, the ideas of Scottish political economist Sir James Steuart—citing 
the “remarkable coincidence . . . between the ideas of the Constitution and 
Mr. Steuart” on the subject of direct taxes.102 
Taylor’s argument was bolstered by an anonymous article published in 
the Aurora.103  The article was written by Edmund Pendleton, who had 
refused to pay the carriage tax.104  In understanding the taxation clauses, 
writes Pendleton, it is essential to distinguish between other countries’ 
“consolidated government[s]” and the “confederated government of United 
States,” where each of the states “retain[s] distinct sovereignty and rights.”105  
The “great clue” to giving the “fair and proper construction to the words of 
the Constitution” is the “great object . . . to preserve to each State . . . its due 
share in Representation, and to fix the like proportion of the public 
burdens.”106  Because of this distinction between consolidated and 
confederated governments, “it is a strange mode of interpreting an 
American instrument, to have recourse to foreign Lexicons, or foreign 
theoretical writers on their systems; instead of inquiring how custom had 
fixed a meaning to those expressions amongst ourselves.”107  Pendleton looks 
instead to the history of taxation in the Continental Congress to conclude 
that “by the terms, duties and customs, in the Constitution, were meant the 
impost duties [i.e., on imports] . . . and by direct taxes, . . . all internal 
taxation.”108  In Virginia, he notes, both the “habit” and the “constant tenor 
of our laws” make “duty and impost . . . synonymous terms, and expressive of 
the duty on imported articles.”109  He believes “that they are so understood 
in the other states[,] . . . considering that the old [Continental] Congress 
plainly so used them.”110 
Pendleton notes that “we in Virginia can say little” of the term “excise,” 
“having never experienced [it] before the revolution.”111  He calls the excise 
 
101 Id. at 31. 
102 Id. 
103 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 332 (citing Edmund 
Pendleton, United States against Hilton:  Some Remarks on the Argument of Mr. Wickham, 
AURORA GENERAL ADVERTISER, February 11, 1796, available at http://news.google.com/
newspapers?nid=t_XbbNNkFXoC&dat=17960211&printsec=frontpage&hl=en). 
104 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON , supra note 30, at 309, 332. 
105 Pendleton, supra note 103. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
109 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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“a disagreeable feature in the constitution [that] was supposed to extend to 
a duty on articles manufactured for sale only.”112  He then concurs expressly 
with “Mr. Taylor, that if carriages can be excised in the manner of this law, 
no line can be drawn for stopping the selection of every other article of 
property.”113  If the “use of the term excise [as] in England” is permitted, 
then “it is easy to prophecy that the great principle of the union, 
to . . . apportion[] taxation[,] may be sacrificed to a loose expression, 
undefined, and little understood when used.”114  In conclusion, Pendleton 
argued that “a construction which preserves the great principle of state 
justice, the apparent intention of the constitution [sic] . . . and [which] at 
the same time tends to aid the receipt of public revenue, must surely be 
preferred . . . to terms arbitrarily used by foreign writers, and pressed into 
the service of destroying that justice.”115 
Before publishing his remarks, Pendleton sent a draft copy to James 
Madison, who had voted against the carriage tax as a member of Congress 
because he believed it was unconstitutional.116  Madison wrote back that he 
was pleased that Pendleton’s article “will be printed in the newspapers in 
time for the Judges to have the benefit of it.”117  Madison declined an 
invitation to contribute to the document, which he called “unquestionably a 
most simple & lucid view of the subject.”118  He commented, “[t]here never 
was a question on which my mind was more satisfied; and yet I have little 
expectation that it will be viewed by the Court in the same light it is by 
me.”119 
Madison’s prediction was right.  The Supreme Court unanimously 






116 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 51, at 730 (“Mr. Madison objected to this tax on 
carriages as an unconstitutional tax; and, as an unconstitutional measure, he would vote 
against it.”); 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 331 (citing 
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 7, 1796), in 19 JAMES MADISON 
PAPERS 21 (ms., Library of Congress), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/
collections/madison_papers/index.html) (“In [a letter to Pendleton] Madison 
acknowledge receipt of a critique of the carriage tax statute which Pendleton had 
prepared and forwarded to Madison for publication.”). 
117 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 331 (quoting Letter from James Madison to 
Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 7, 1796), in 19 JAMES MADISON LETTERS 21 (ms., Library of 
Congress), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/collections/madison_papers/
index.html). 
118 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 7, 1796), in 7 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 
450 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2003); available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/collections/
madison_papers/index.html. 
119 Id. 
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author, Hamilton, argued the government’s case in a three-hour session 
before the Court, an event so widely attended by congressmen and senators 
that Congress struggled to obtain a quorum that day.120  Only his notes 
survive, but it appears that Hamilton cited Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 
and indicated that Smith’s definition of direct tax was “[p]robably 
contemplated . . . by [the] Convention,”121 thus introducing what appears to 
be an element of Old Originalism’s search for what the Convention 
delegates were thinking, along with New Orginalism’s focus on general 
usage.  Contra Taylor and Pendleton, Hamilton “suggested the utility of 
seeking the constitutional meaning . . . ‘in the statutory language of 
[England], from which our Jurisprudence is derived.’”122  In looking at that 
jurisprudential history, Hamilton finds that if “the meaning of the word 
excise is to be sought in the British Statutes, it will be found to include the 
duty on carriages, which is there considered as an excise.”123  Furthermore, as 
to congressional authority under the Constitution, Hamilton’s bottom line is 
that “[s]uch a Construction must be made as that Power to tax may remain 
in its plenitude consistently with convenient application of the rule of 
Apportionment.”124  Since the rule of apportionment does not apply to 
“excises,” the carriage tax need only be uniform.125 
3.  The Judgment:  “The Objects that the Framers . . . contemplated” 
Three justices wrote opinions in Hylton—Chase, Iredell and Paterson—
and they all found the tax to be constitutional.126  To varying degrees, all 
three employed the concept of the Framers’ intentions.  A fourth, Justice 
Wilson, had “before expressed a judicial opinion on the subject, in the 
 
120 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 339  (quoting Letter from 
Justice Iredell to Mrs. Iredell, February 26, 1796, in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF 
JAMES IREDELL 460, 461 (Griffith J. McRee ed. 1857)) (“. . . Mr. Hamilton spoke in our 
Court, attended by the most crowded audience I ever saw there, both Houses of Congress 
being almost deserted.”). 
121 Id. at 333–34 (quoting Brief for Defendant in error, Alexander Hamilton, Hylton v. 
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), in id. at 342, 346). 
122 Id. at 335 (quoting Statement of the Material Points of the Case on part of defendant in 
error, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), in id. at 351, 355).  The record 
of the arguments for Hylton has not been preserved.  Id. at 333 (“[I]n his printed report 
of the [Hylton] case, Dallas did not set out a summary of the arguments of counsel.”). 
123 Statement of the Material Points of the Case, on part of defendant in error, Hylton v. 
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), in id. at 351, 355. 
124 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 335 (quoting Brief, by 
Hamilton of counsel for defendant in error, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), in id. at 
342, 348) (emphasis omitted). 
125 See id. at 355 (“[If the carriage tax is] considered as an excise . . . [it] then must necessarily 
be uniform, not liable to apportionment, [and] consequently not a direct tax.”). 
126 See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (Chase, J.); id. at 181 (Paterson, J.); id. at 183 (Iredell, 
J.). 
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Circuit Court of Virginia,” so he did not participate other than to say that his 
“sentiments, in favor of the constitutionality of the tax in question, have not 
been changed.”127  Meanwhile, Justice Cushing had not heard the oral 
argument, and he thought “it would be improper to give an opinion on the 
merits of the cause,”128 and Chief Justice Ellsworth had been sworn in only 
that morning.129  The lack of a quorum did not appear to disturb the 
justices, perhaps because Justice Wilson’s vote was already on the record. 
Justice Paterson wrote the longest and most thoughtful opinion in 
Hylton, and he relied most heavily on the Framers.130  His view was that “the 
[semantic] argument”—that is, essentially the New Originalism approach—
“on both sides turns in a circle.”131  His concern was that “the natural and 
common, or technical and appropriate, meaning of the words, duty and 
excise, is not easy to ascertain.”132  Because “[d]ifferent persons will annex 
different significations to the terms,”133 he leaves these definitional points 
aside, however, to focus instead on what was “obviously the intention” of his 
fellow constitutional Framers—“that Congress should possess full power over 
 
127 Id. at 184 (Wilson, J.). 
128 Id. (Cushing, J.). 
129 See id. at 172 n.* (“The Chief Justice Ellsworth, was sworn into office, in the morning; but 
not having heard the whole of the argument, he declined taking any part in the decision 
of this cause.”). 
130 Id. at 175–81 (Paterson, J.).  In the background, it is almost possible to hear Justice 
Paterson saying something like, “The Convention could have chosen a state-focused 
constitutional design with much more limited national powers.  It was called the Paterson 
Plan.”  As Currie notes, the Court’s decision was unanimous and described “in seriatim 
opinions.”  CURRIE, supra note 3, at 31. 
131 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 176 (Paterson, J.). 
132 Id.  These comments about the Justice’s lack of familiarity with the meaning of these tax-
related terms are especially intriguing in light of the fact that he, as a delegate from New 
Jersey, had employed some of those same terms at other moments in his career:  He had 
introduced a plan for a constitution to the Constitutional Convention on June 15, 1787 
that included the word “duty,” and, at that time, he was familiar enough with the 
meaning of “duty” to use it in association with “goods or merchandises of foreign growth 
or manufacture, imported into any part of the United States.”  JAMES MADISON, 2 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, PURCHASED BY ORDER OF CONGRESS; BEING HIS 
CORRESPONDENCE AND REPORTS OF DEBATES DURING THE CONGRESS OF THE 
CONFEDERATION AND HIS REPORTS OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 862, 863 
(Henry D. Gilpin ed., 1841).  An interesting summary of the various positions taken in 
the Convention by key players in the carriage tax drama is provided by “Doctor Johnson,” 
as recorded in Madison’s notes (June 21, 1787): 
On a comparison of the two plans which had been proposed from Virginia and 
New Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which characterized the latter was its 
being calculated to preserve the individuality of the States.  The plan from Virginia 
did not profess to destroy this individuality altogether; but was charged with such a 
tendency.  One Gentlemen alone (Col. HAMILTON) in his animadversions on the 
plan of New Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the State 
Governments. 
  Id. at 920–21. 
133 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 176 (Paterson, J.). 
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every species of taxable property, except exports.”134  He testifies that “the 
principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers . . . contemplated 
as falling within the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax 
on land.”135  He then describes the political issue that the Framers were 
addressing in reaching the disputed constitutional language:  “The provision 
was made in favor of the southern States,” notes Paterson, which “possessed 
a large number of slaves; [and] had extensive tracts of territory, thinly 
settled, and not very productive.”136  If there had been no special 
consideration for this situation, “Congress . . . might tax slaves . . . and land 
in every part of the Union after the same rate or measure,” thus 
disproportionately burdening the South.137  Preventing this kind of 
disproportionate taxation was, according to Justice Paterson, “the reason of 
introducing the clause in the Constitution” linking representation and 
direct taxes.138 
Paterson further explains why he is focusing on the Framers’ intentions 
by pointing out that the “Constitution has been considered as an 
accommodating system; it was the effect of mutual sacrifices and 
concessions; it was the work of compromise.”139  The “rule of 
apportionment” is, for Justice Paterson, an unfortunate compromise:  “it is 
radically wrong; it cannot be supported by any solid reasoning.”140  He asks 
rhetorically, “[w]hy should slaves, who are a species of property, be 
represented more than any other property?”141  While the constitutional deal 
needs to be honored, according to Paterson, he argued that this specific 
constitutional compromise “ought not to be extended by construction.”142  
That is, a constitutional bargain was struck to accommodate specific 
Southern concerns about the relationship of slavery to representation and 
taxation, but that compromise should not be understood to change the 
basic principle embraced by the Framers, which was to give Congress broad 
powers in the area of taxation. 
Paterson continues on his theme of interpreting the language of the 
Constitution in light of the Framers’ intentions when he addresses the 
argument: 
that an equal participation of the expense or burden by the several 
states . . . was the primary object, which the framers of the Constitution 
 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 177. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177 (1796). 
139 Id. at 177–78. 
140 Id. at 178. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
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had in view; and that this object will be effected by the principle of 
apportionment, which is an operation upon states, and not on 
individuals; for, each state will be debited for . . . its quota of the tax, and 
credited for its payments.143 
Paterson counters by noting that such an approach was not what happened 
when the constitutional bargain was made; rather it is the same as “the old 
system of requisitions” under the Articles of Confederation.144  Under the 
Articles, “Congress could not . . . raise money by taxes . . . . They had no 
coercive authority . . . . Requisitions were a dead letter, unless the state 
legislatures could be brought into action; and when they were, the sums 
raised were very disproportional.”145  The point of the taxing powers under 
the Constitution was instead for the national government to have the “fiscal 
power . . . exerted certainly, equally, and effectually on individuals.”146  (In 
the background, it is almost possible to hear Justice Paterson saying 
something like, “The Convention could have chosen a state-focused 
constitutional design with much more limited national powers.  It was called 
the Paterson Plan.”) 
While Justice Iredell does not specifically mention the Framers, he shares 
Paterson’s focus on intention.  Iredell relies specifically on the fact that “the 
present Constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not 
states[,] . . . [a]nd this is the leading distinction between the articles of 
Confederation and the present Constitution.”147  The national power to tax 
is thus sufficiently broad that Congress even has the authority to impose 
taxes that are neither direct nor “comprehended within the term duty, 
impost or excise.”148  Such other taxes, he “presume[s] . . . ought to be 
uniform.”149  He then shows that the carriage tax could not reasonably be 
apportioned without being “destructive of the . . . common interest, upon 
which the very principles of the Constitution are founded,”150 especially 
since some of the states have very few carriages, whose owners would be 
forced to pay massive sums per carriage compared to carriage owners in 
some of the southern states.  Therefore, the carriage tax must not be a direct 






147 Id. at 181 (Iredell, J.). 
148 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 183.  His answer is that carriage owners would pay different amounts in each state 
based on representation, while “[i]f any state had no carriages, there could be no 
apportionment at all.”  Id. at 182. 
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Of the three opinions, only Justice Chase expresses any concerns about 
the concept of judicial review.  Because he voted to uphold the law, he said 
that it was “unnecessary, at this time . . . to determine, whether this court, 
constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of Congress void, on 
the ground of its being made contrary to, and in violation of, the 
Constitution.”151  Justice Chase signals, however, that “if the court have such 
power, I . . . declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very clear case.”152 
As for the meaning of the constitutional language, Chase says that he 
would normally be inclined to defer to the construction of the “National 
Legislature, (who did not consider a tax on carriages a direct tax, but 
thought it was within the description of a duty).”153  But in this case, relying 
solely on the legislative judgment was not necessary because Chase was 
“inclined to think, that a tax on carriages is not a direct tax, within the letter, 
or meaning, of the Constitution.”154  To reach this conclusion, Chase, in his 
brief opinion, looks beyond the text to the “great object of the 
Constitution,” which was “to give Congress a power to lay taxes, adequate to 
the exigencies of government,”155 and he talks about what “the framers of 
the Constitution” contemplated.156  In this particular case, Chase concludes, 
“an annual tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons” is an indirect tax 
because any “tax on expense is an indirect tax.”157  For Chase, the carriage 
tax is a “duty,” which “is the most comprehensive next to the generical term 
tax; and practically in Great Britain, (whence we take our general ideas of 
taxes, duties, imposts, excises, customs, &c.) . . . is not confined to taxes on 
importation only.”158 
B.  Historical Overview:  Many Sources of Multiple Meanings 
Both sides in the Hylton case summoned a broad collection of 
distinguished published sources in support of their preferred definitions of 
direct tax, excise, and related terms.  They did their homework, they made 
excellent points, and it is difficult to say that one or the other represents the 
meaning that a “hypothetical reasonably well-informed Ratifier would have 
objectively understood the legal text to mean with all of the relevant 
 
151 Id. at 175 (Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
152 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
153 Id. at 173 (emphasis omitted). 
154 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  While Chase uses the language of intention—and it would be difficult for him to 
identify the “great object” otherwise—most of his focus in on the language itself. 
157 Id. at 175 (emphasis omitted). 
158 Id. (emphasis omitted).  Chase further notes, “I am inclined to think, but of this I do not 
give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are 
only . . . a capitation, or poll tax . . . and a tax on land.”  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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information in hand.”159  Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the 
debate over the meaning of “excise”—a term that, at that time, had existed 
in Anglo-American tax law only for about 150 years, and that represented 
over half of the British government’s tax revenues at the time of American 
independence.160  Such a term should surely have an easily determined 
objective meaning, yet neither the parties in Hylton nor the authors of this 
article were able to agree on one.  To illustrate this practical challenge to 
New Originalism’s textual goal, it is worth reviewing the evidence about the 
meaning and usage of the term “excise” in some detail.  (It is possible to 
repeat this type of analysis for “duty,” “import” and other tax-related terms, 
but this article focuses on originalism rather than taxation, and this clear 
example amply makes the methodological point.) 
1.  Dictionaries, Commentaries, and Historical Usage 
If we begin by looking at the views of scholars and other commentators, a 
clear and consistent definition of an excise tax emerges.  The secondary 
literature, both now and at the time the Constitution was adopted, all points 
in the same direction, and the answer is neatly summarized by a modern 
historian of the excise in Great Britain as “commodity taxes on home [i.e., 
domestically produced] products.”161  Or, as seventeenth-century building 
and insurance magnate, Nicholas Barbon, wrote, “For every Man that Works, 
pays by those things which he Eats and Wears, something to the 
Government.”162  It was, as described by the most recent historian of the 
English excise, William Ashworth, and numerous others, a tax on the 
consumption of local goods.163  An excise, for virtually all of the 
commentators of the past several hundred years, is, strictly speaking, a tax 
on the sale or creation of “goods manufactured or grown domestically.  It is 
meant to be a duty on inland goods as distinct from customs levied on 
imported commodities.”164  The 1785 edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary 
 
159 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1162. 
160 See WILLIAM J. ASHWORTH, CUSTOMS AND EXCISE:  TRADE, PRODUCTION, AND CORRUPTION 
IN ENGLAND 1640–1845, at 5 (2003). 
161 John Torrance, Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation:  The Commissioners for Examining the 
Public Accounts 1780–1787, 78 PAST & PRESENT 56, 80–81 (1978). 
162 Nicholas Barbon, A Discourse of Trade (1690), in A REPRINT OF ECONOMIC TRACTS  23 
(Jacob H. Hollander ed., 1905). 
163 See ASHWORTH, supra note 160, at 44–62 (citing sources). 
164 Id. at 4.  He goes on to write, however, that “certain imports came under the management 
of the excise . . . from 1643 to 1825 when most of the excised imports were transferred to 
the customs . . . [and] some exports during the English Civil War and the Interregnum 
also paid an excise.”  Id. 
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of the English Language defined the excise as “[a] hateful tax levied upon 
commodities.”165  Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations in 1776, wrote: 
The duties of excise are imposed chiefly upon goods of home produce 
destined for home consumption.  They are imposed only upon a few 
sorts of goods of the most general use.  There can never be any doubt 
either concerning the goods which are subject to those duties, or 
concerning the particular duty which each species of goods is subject to.  
They fall almost altogether upon what I call luxuries, excepting [those] 
upon salt, soap, leather, candles, and, perhaps, that upon green glass.166 
In a similar vein, William Blackstone penned the following definition of the 
excise:  “Directly opposite in its nature to [imposts on merchandise] is the 
excise duty, which is an inland imposition, paid sometimes upon the 
consumption of the commodity, or frequently upon the retail sale, which is 
the last stage before the consumption.”167 
Noah Webster published the first major American dictionary in the 
1820s, and it also defined the term “excise” in terms of a tax on commodities 
when “consumed . . . or on the retail,” as follows: 
An inland duty or impost, laid on commodities consumed; or on the 
retail, which is the last stage before consumption; as an excise on coffee, 
soap, candles, which a person consumes in his family.  But many articles 
are excised at the manufactories, as spirit at the distillery, printed silks 
and linens at the printer’s, &c.168 
Interestingly, nearly two hundred years later, the “revised and updated” 2002 
version of Webster’s dictionary provides a definition of excise that has 
remained much the same as the early-nineteenth-century version:  “tax 
levied on domestic goods during manufacture or before sale.”169  A carriage 
might be included in a broad definition of a “commodity,” but is an annual 
tax on ownership the same as a tax on “consumption” or “on the retail”?  
Hamilton said yes, and the Virginians said no.170   
 
165 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: IN WHICH THE WORDS ARE 
DEDUCED FROM THEIR ORIGINALS, AND ILLUSTRATED IN THEIR DIFFERENT SIGNIFICATIONS BY 
EXAMPLES FROM THE BEST WRITERS 726 (6th ed. 1785). 
166 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 493 
(1776). 
167 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *237. 
168 1 NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 989 (1828).  Webster had 
also published “a modest, small-sized dictionary” in 1806, which has been called the “first 
dictionary of any significance produced by an American.”  Sidney I. Landau, Johnson’s 
Influence on Webster and Worcester in Early American Lexicography, 18 INT’L J. LEXICOGRAPHY 
217, 217 (2005); see generally JOSEPH H. FRIEND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
LEXICOGRAPHY, 1798–1864 (1967). 
169 WEBSTER’S NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE:  REVISED AND UPDATED 168 
(Merriam-Webster ed., 2002); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Excise, (New ed. 2000), 
available at http://www.oed.com/. 
170 To some extent the debate over the meaning of “excise” in Hylton is between the first two 
examples of meaning recorded in the modern Oxford English Dictionary—the “gen.” 
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Perhaps historical usage will be more illuminating.  “That [her] Subjects 
may the more cheerfully bear the necessary taxes,” Queen Anne asked 
Parliament in 1702 to check for “abuses or mismanagements” in the 
“accounts of the public receipt and expenditure.”171  Perhaps the least 
cheerfully borne tax, and the one most likely to be abused, was the dreaded 
excise, which had first appeared in 1643, and would be greatly enlarged 
during Britain’s expensively bellicose eighteenth century.172  Prior to the 
introduction of the first excise in 1643, taxes had “[t]raditionally . . . been 
collected on land and on foreign goods at the port of arrival.”173  In contrast, 
the excise taxed the manufacture, sale or, if homemade, consumption of 
domestically produced goods, typically the purchase of essential items such 
as food and drink.  The Long Parliament, which needed to pay for the First 
English Civil War, announced that there would be a tax on “strong beer or 
ale, of 8s. the barrel, 1s.; for a hogshead of cyder or perry, 1s.; to be paid by 
the first buyer.  The same tax was laid on the housekeeper for beer, ale, 
cyder, or perry brewed or made for his own spending.”174  The proclamation 
went on to cover “all sorts of wines” and tobacco; before the year was out, 
silk, soap and salt were added, and rabbits and pigeons became fair game for 
the excise as well.175  By taxing popular and often necessary consumables 
such as beer, wine, salt, rabbits, and soap, the government found a new and 
ultimately very lucrative, “inland” or “interior” revenue.176  Not surprisingly, 
 
meaning, which is “[a]ny toll or tax,” and the “spec.” meaning, “[a] duty charged on 
home goods, either in the process of their manufacture or before their sale to the home 
consumers . . . .”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Excise, (New ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.oed.com/.  The first example cited for the “gen.” meaning is the Latin text 
of a treaty between England and Florence in 1490:  “Quas excisas, gabellas, et dacias dicti 
subditi Regis Angliae in dicta civitate Pisarum solvent et dabunt.”  Id.  The first example 
in England of the “spec.” meaning is from 1642:  “Aspersions are by malignant persons 
cast upon this House that they intend to . . . lay excizes upon . . . commodities.”  Id. 
(alteration in original). 
171 ASHWORTH, supra note 160, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting JOHN 
OWENS, PLAIN PAPERS RELATING TO THE EXCISE BRANCH OF THE INLAND REVENUE 
DEPARTMENT FROM 1621 TO 1878:  OR A HISTORY OF THE EXCISE 15 (1879)). 
172 See id. at 4.  Ashworth points out that “[b]etween 1693 and 1815 England/Britain was at 
war for fifty-six years, while revenues grew by a factor of thirty-six between the reign of 
Charles I and the arrival of Lord Liverpool’s administration in the 1810s.”  Id.; see generally 
PABLO PEBRER, TAXATION, REVENUE, EXPENDITURE, POWER, STATISTICS, AND DEBT OF THE 
WHOLE BRITISH EMPIRE THEIR ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE:  WITH AN 
ESTIMATE OF THE CAPITAL AND RESOURCES OF THE EMPIRE, AND A PRACTICAL PLAN FOR 
APPLYING THEM TO THE LIQUIDATION OF THE NATIONAL DEBT:  THE WHOLE FOUNDED ON, 
AND ILLUSTRATED BY, OFFICIAL TABLES, AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS 48 (1833); Patrick K. 
O’Brien & Philip Hunt, The Emergence and Consolidation of Excises in the English Fiscal System 
Before the Glorious Revolution, 1 BRIT. TAX REV. 35 (1997).  
173 SLAUGHTER, supra note 4, at 12. 
174 ASHWORTH, supra note 160, at 94–95. 
175 Id. at 95. 
176 Id. 
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to collect these new taxes, excise officers needed to have “unprecedented 
power to enter cellars, warehouses, and shops, and examine persons on 
oath.”177  And then, by the middle of the eighteenth century, excise officers 
were further authorized to enter and search any properties that might be 
brewing cider, including private homes.178 
“Never, within memory,” writes historian Thomas Slaughter, “had the 
poor, the propertyless, and the disenfranchised been taxed for support of 
the government,”179 and political battles attended each of the government’s 
nearly relentless efforts to increase and expand the excise tax.  These 
disputes included a foreshadowing of colonial American concerns over 
“taxation without representation” as well as battles over “the extent and 
nature of the commodities to be taxed; namely, luxuries versus necessaries 
(the rich versus the poor).”180  This volatile mixture of taxing everyone, 
including the poor, for the consumption of necessities, with the 
accompanying need for the government to pry into both private homes and 
quotidian commercial transactions, led to everything from political protests 
and riots to bartering, smuggling, and other efforts to circumvent “‘that so 
much abhorred Tax . . . of Excise.’”181  As Andrew Marvell wrote in London 
in 1776: 
Excise, a monster worse than e’er before 
Frightened the midwife, and the mother tore. 
A thousand hands she has, a thousand eyes, 
Breaks into shops, and into cellars prys; 
With hundred rows of teeth the shark exceeds, 
And on all trades, like Casawar, she feeds . . . . 182 
Even if it was not always cheerfully borne by the heavily taxed populace, the 
excise, which accounted for 36% of English national revenues in 1685 and as 
much as 56% during the war for American independence,183 was highly 
 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 319, 320. 
179 SLAUGHTER, supra note 4, at 13. 
180 ASHWORTH, supra note 160, at 53. 
181 Edward Raymond Turner, Early Opinion About English Excise, 21 AM. HIST. REV. 314, 316 
(1916) (quoting A Narrative of the late Parliament (so called), etc., in 3 THE HARLEIAN 
MISCELLANY:  OR A COLLECTION OF SCARCE, CURIOUS, AND ENTERTAINING PAMPHLETS AND 
TRACTS, ALL WELL AS MANUSCRIPTS AS IN PRINT, FOUND IN THE LATE EARL OF OXFORD’S 
LIBRARY 430, 446 (1745)) (alteration in original).  As to bartering, a 1645 ordinance 
specified that “'the exchange of one sort of good for another is accounted a sale involving 
liability of Excise duty if both or either sort is of a dutiable description.”  ASHWORTH, 
supra note 160, at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
182 Turner, supra note 151, at 316 (quoting Andrew Marvell, Instructions to a Painter, About the 
Dutch Wars, in 3 EDWARD THOMPSON, THE WORKS OF ANDREW MARVEL, ESQ.:  POETICAL, 
CONTROVERSIAL, AND POLITICAL 365, 369–70 (1667)). 
183 ASHWORTH, supra note 160, at 5. 
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popular among experts in taxation.  Sir William Petty, in his 1689 Discourse of 
Taxes and Contributions, for example, extolled the “very perfect Idea of 
making a Leavy on Consumptions,”184 and a writer in 1644 declared that “the 
Impost, called Excise [is] . . . the most equal and indifferent Levy that can be 
laid upon the people,” noting further that “all ingenious men who have 
studied the Nature and Product of it, upon the result of solemn and serious 
Debates, have acknowledged it so to be.”185 
Battles nevertheless frequently ensued whenever the government sought 
to extend the excise to yet another item of commerce; as a result, there is an 
extensive collection of historical documents illuminating the application of 
the excise tax in Britain between its inauguration in 1643 and the adoption 
of the United States Constitution in 1787.  The liveliest dispute may have 
occurred in 1733 with Sir Robert Walpole’s proposal “changing Duties on 
Importation into Inland Duties, that is, the Customs on these two 
Commodities [tobacco and wine] into Excises.”186  One of the primary 
reasons for the attempt to repeal these imposts and replace them with 
excises was that the imposts had “been found liable to great Frauds and 
Abuses,” which the scheme’s proponents hoped excises would correct.187 
The measures generated intense opposition that ultimately led to the 
defeat of Walpole’s plan, with the principal concern being the tendency 
toward a “general excise.”188  One Member of Parliament, William Pulteney, 
was among those who voted against the bills.189  Pulteney cited the possibility 
that once the excise replaced the imposts on wine and tobacco, “the same 
plausible pretence of frauds might, with equal justice, have been extended 
to other customable commodities,” ultimately resulting in a dramatic 
 
184 WILLIAM PETTY, A DISCOURSE OF TAXES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 69 (1689). 
185 Turner, supra note 181, at 316 (quoting CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING THE EXCISE OF 
NATIVE AND FOREIGN COMMODITIES (1644)). 
186 BARON JOHN HERVEY HERVEY, THE REPLY OF A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT TO THE MAYOR OF 
HIS CORPORATION 16 (1733). 
187 A Bill for Repealing Several Subsidies and an Impost now Payable on Tobacco of the 
British Plantations, and for Granting an Inland Duty in Lieu Thereof, in THE MOST 
IMPORTANT TRANSACTIONS OF THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE FIRST PARLIAMENT OF HIS 
MAJESTY KING GEORGE II 3 (4th ed. 1733). 
188 For an explanation of the context of the 1733 bill, including the political situation with 
regard to Sir Robert Walpole and the reason for its having been introduced, see generally 
SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, 3 A STUDENT’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND:  FROM THE EARLIEST 
TIMES TO 1885, at 722–24 (1891); PAUL LANGFORD, THE EXCISE CRISIS:  SOCIETY AND 
POLITICS IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE (1975) [hereinafter LANGFORD, THE EXCISE CRISIS]; 
PAUL LANGFORD, A POLITE AND COMMERCIAL PEOPLE 28–33 (1998) [hereinafter 
LANGFORD, COMMERCIAL PEOPLE]. 
189 WILLIAM PULTENEY, A LETTER FROM A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT TO HIS FRIEND IN THE 
COUNTRY GIVING HIS REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE FARTHER EXTENSION OF THE EXCISE 
LAWS (1733). 
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expansion in the number of goods excised.190  John Hervey, another MP, 
supported the tobacco bill and authored a pamphlet, in which he tried to 
refute the argument made by the bill’s opponents that the extension of the 
excise would be fatal to liberty by asking the question, “why the excising 
these two Commodities, Wine and Tobacco, should have Consequences so 
much more terrible to Liberty, than the excising of all those Commodities 
already subject to this Method of Taxation?”191 
The Dialogue between Sir Andrew Freeport and Timothy Squat, Esquire, on the 
Subject of Excises is a pamphlet constructed in the dialectical method to 
showcase the absurdity of the arguments of the opponents of the bill (at 
least in the mind of the author of the pamphlet).  The character of Timothy 
Squat was cast as a strong opponent of the measure, while Sir Freeport 
argued in favor of the bill.  In one passage, Squat details his “last General 
Objection” to the bill as being “it has a direct and strong Tendency to a 
General Excise.”192  This sentiment refers to Pulteney’s argument—
frequently made at the time—that once Parliament extended the excise one 
step further, it would provide justification for extending it to all excisable 
items:  “every Thing that we eat, drink or cloath ourselves withal, will be 
thrown under the Claws of this rapacious Dragon,” i.e. the excise.193  Sir 
Andrew, in summarizing Squat’s argument, restates it as follows:  “Food and 
Raiment, Bread, Butter and Cheese, Fish Flesh and Fowl, all the 
Commodities of our own Produce which we can’t subsist without . . . [have] 
to have a new Tax levied upon ‘em by way of Excise.”194 
Of particular relevance to the constitutional conflict in Hylton is the 1747 
Act of Parliament “granting to his Majesty several Rates and Duties upon 
Coaches, and other Carriages.”195  The tax would be paid annually on 
 
190 Id. at 17.  This would have been significant for many reasons, but one of them is that 
opponents of the excise generally believed the tax to be unfair, undemocratic, and 
abusive, in part because those accused of violating excise tax laws were not entitled to jury 
trials; instead, these cases were brought before the commissioners of excise.  See id.; 
ANDREW FREEPORT, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN SIR ANDREW FREEPORT AND TIMOTHY SQUAT, 
ESQUIRE, ON THE SUBJECT OF EXCESS BEING A FULL REVIEW OF THE WHOLE DISPUTE 
CONCERNING A CHANGE OF THE DUTIES ON WINE AND TOBACCO INTO AN EXCISE 15–19 
(1733); OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LAW OF EXCISE SHEWING, I.  THAT EXCISES MUST BE 
DESTRUCTIVE OF TRADE IN GENERAL, II.  THAT EXCISES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE 8–14 (1733) [hereinafter OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LAWS OF 
EXCISE]. 
191 HERVEY, supra note 186, at 23 (emphasis added); see also OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LAWS 
OF EXCISE 6. 
192 FREEPORT, supra note 190, at 23 (emphasis omitted). 
193 Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted). 
194 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
195 6 Geo. II, c. 10, § 349 (1747). 
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carriages,196 and its collection would be “under the Management of the 
Commissioners and Officers of the Excise.”197  And so, as in Congress’ 1794 
tax on carriages, the payments required by the tax were called “rates and 
duties,” and, in Britain, they would be collected by officials explicitly 
described as excise officers.  This system of collection continued until 1785 
when the responsibility for collecting the carriage tax (and certain stamp 
taxes) was transferred to the “Commissioners for the Affairs of Taxes.”198  
Although the Acts of Parliament did not specifically call the “rates and 
duties” on carriages “excise” taxes, they were collected by excisemen, and 
even Hylton’s lawyer admitted that England’s carriage taxes were called 
“excises.”199 
Much as England had imported this domestic tax from Holland—
prompting protests of “No excise, no wooden shoes200—the American 
colonies, and then the new government of the United States, adopted the 
excise from Britain.  A broad overview of the colonial excise situation is 
given in Frederic Howe’s history of the internal revenue system in the 
United States, which shows that excise taxes were adopted primarily in the 
North: 
[A]t the time of the Revolution excise taxes had been developed to 
considerable extent in several of the colonies.  In Connecticut, not only 
all ardent spirits, but foreign articles of consumption generally, had been 
the objects of an inland duty . . . . [I]n New York, beer, wine, and liquors 
of all kinds sold at retail, as well as receipts from sales at auction.  Spirits 
were also taxable in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.201 
It thus appears that the excises in the colonies were to a great extent focused 
on alcohol, with other traditionally excisable items like tea and tobacco also 
being taxed in some states.202 
 
196 Described as “every Coach, Berlin, Landau, Chariot, Calash with four Wheels, Chaise 
Marine, Chaise with four Wheels, and Caravan, or by what Name soever such carriages 
now are, or hereafter may be called . . . that shall be kept by or for any Person, for his or 
her own Use, or to be Let out to Hire.”  Id. 
197 Id. 
198 See 9 Geo. III, c. 47, § 538–39 (1785) (“An Act for transferring the Receipt and 
Management of certain Duties therein mentioned from the Commissioners of Excise, and 
the Commissioners of Stamps respectively, to the Commissioners for the Affairs of Taxes; 
and also for making further Provisions in respect to the said Duties so transferred.”).  
199 See 6 Geo. II, c. 10, §349 (1747); TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 5. 
200 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 4, at 15; see also ASHWORTH, supra note 160 at 17 (discussing 
the tax’s Dutch origins); Turner, supra note 181, at 315 (noting opposition to “this 
monstrous tax”). 
201 FREDERIC CLEMSON HOWE, TAXATION AND TAXES IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM, 1791–1895; AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ORGANIZATION, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND LATER MODIFICATION OF DIRECT AND EXCISE TAXATION UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION 16 (1896). 
202 See 4 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 302 (discussing various items on which 
Duties of Excise were levied in the colonies). 
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As in Britain, however, some states extended the excises beyond these 
types of consumables.  In 1781, Massachusetts adopted an “act laying certain 
duties of excise on certain articles.”203  In addition to requiring taxes to be 
paid on the retail sale of spirits such as brandy and “New England Rum,” the 
act provided for annual “duties” to be paid by “every Owner or Possessor of 
any Coach, Chariot, Four wheel Carriage, Phaeton, Chaise or Sulkey 
Chair.”204  Similarly, Rhode Island, in 1786, enacted a law “laying Duties of 
Excise on certain Articles therein described.”205  As in Massachusetts, taxes 
were paid on retail sales of “Rum, Wine and other distilled spirits,” as well as 
a yearly “Duty . . . for each Carriage, Horse, or Dog, and Billiard-Table 
. . . owned or possessed.”206  A few lines later, the act specifically describes 
these examples of personal property as being “excised” items.207  And so, 
whatever may have been the general understanding of excise taxes in other 
regions of America around the time the Constitution was adopted, there are 
clear examples in two New England states where the ownership of carriages 
(and other items of personal property) were “excised” on an annual basis. 
2.  Constitutional Convention and Ratification 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention were considerably more 
concerned about direct taxation—and its link to representation—than 
excises or any other form of “indirect” taxes.  In light of Justice Patterson’s 
focus in Hylton on the Framers’ intentions, it may be useful to provide a 
fuller discussion of the drafting and ratification debates than just those few 
instances where the term “excise” was addressed.  In doing so, it is possible 
to see the basis for Justice Paterson’s conclusion that the nature of the 
negotiations over representation at the Convention meant that “direct tax” 
should be read narrowly, thus leading to an expansive definition of “excise” 
and other forms of indirect taxes. 
According to James Madison’s notes of the Convention, following weeks 
of debates about representation in the new national government, 
Gouverneur Morris proposed “that taxation shall be in proportion to 
representation.”208  Southern delegates complained that this approach would 
 
203 Mass. Acts §17 (1781) at 525–33.  For a discussion of the controversy surrounding en 
earlier Massachusetts excise tax, and the degree to which the rhetoric was informed by 
familiarity with similar excise battles in Britain, see Paul S. Boyer, Borrowed Rhetoric:  The 
Massachusetts Excise Controversy of 1754, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 328 (1964). 
204 Mass. Acts § 17 (1781) at 529. 
205 R.I. Acts & Resolves 23 (1786) (“March, 1786,  An ACT laying Duties of Excise on certain 
Articles therein described.”). 
206 Id. at 25, 28. 
207 Id. at 28–29. 
208 MADISON, supra note 132, at 1079. 
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be unfair, with Pierce Butler of South Carolina seeking representation based 
on “the full number of inhabitants, including all the blacks.”209  Morris 
responded, saying that these objections “would be removed by restraining 
the rule to direct taxation.  With regard to indirect taxes on exports and 
imports, and on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable.”210  Morris 
added the word “direct” before “Taxation”, and it “passed, nem. com., as 
follows:  provided always that direct taxation ought to be proportioned to 
representation.”211  At this point, William Davie, sputtering that “it was high 
time now to speak out,” said that this proposal was 
meant by some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any share of 
representation for their blacks.  He was sure that North Carolina would 
never confederate on any terms that did not rate them at least as three 
fifths.  If the Eastern States meant, therefore, to exclude them altogether, 
the business was at an end.212 
In response to these kinds of comments, Connecticut’s Ellsworth proposed 
to include the following language in the Constitution:  “that the rule of 
contribution by direct taxation . . . shall be the number of white inhabitants, 
and three fifths of every other description in the several States,”213 which was 
withdrawn in favor of a similar motion from Edmund Randolph, and the 
debate over slavery, representation and taxation continued.214  The version 
then recommended to the committee on detail contained a clause reading, 
“[p]rovided always, that representation ought to be proportioned to direct 
taxation,” and calling for a periodic census so “that the Legislature of the 
United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.”215 
A few days later, the committee on detail returned with a revised draft 
that included, as the first section of Article VII, “[t]he Legislature of the 
United States shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports, 
and excises.”216  Section 3 specified that the “proportions of direct taxation 
shall be regulated by the whole number of white and other free 
citizens[,] . . . and three fifths of all other persons . . . (except Indians not 
paying taxes).”217  Section 4 specified, “[n]o tax or duty shall be laid by the 
Legislature on articles exported from any State,” and Section 5 said, “[n]o 
 
209 Id. at 1079–80. 
210 Id. at 1080.  He noted further that “he was persuaded that the imports and consumption 
were pretty nearly equal throughout the Union.”  Id. 
211 Id. at 1081 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Nem. com.” is an abbreviation for nemine 
contradicente, Latin for “without objection.” 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 1082. 
214 See id. at 1083. 
215 Id. at 1223. 
216 Id. at 1232. 
217 Id. at 1233. 
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capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census.”218  The 
delegates then moved through the draft clause by clause.219 
In a discussion of the impact of slaves on representation, Gouverneur 
Morris decried the “nefarious institution” of slavery.220  “[W]hat is the 
proposed compensation to the Northern States, for a sacrifice of every 
principle of right, of every impulse of humanity?” he asked.221  His rhetorical 
answer was that they not only would have “to march their militia for the 
defence of the South[],” but also that the “Legislature [would] have 
indefinite power to tax them by excises, and duties on imports,” and he was 
concerned that “excises and duties . . . will fall heavier on [Northern states] 
than on the Southern inhabitants.”222  He also argued, “Let it not be said, 
that direct taxation is to be proportioned to representation.  It is idle to 
suppose that the General Government can stretch its hand directly into the 
pockets of the people, scattered over so vast a county.  They can only do it 
through the medium of exports, imports and excises.”223 
Luther Martin from Maryland, who would ultimately refuse to sign the 
Constitution, wondered “what was meant . . . in the expression,—‘duties,’ 
and ‘imposts.’  If the meaning were the same, the former was unnecessary; if 
different, the matter ought to be made clear.”224  Wilson responded that 
“[d]uties are applicable to many objects to which the word imposts does not 
relate.  The latter are appropriated to commerce, the former extend to a 
variety of objects, as stamp duties, &c.”225 
The discussion subsequently returned to the topic of direct taxation, 
which generated more controversy than excise taxes.  Martin, arguing that 
“[t]he power of taxation is most likely to be criticized by the public,” 
proposed that if the legislature believes that “revenue should be raised by 
direct taxation, . . . requisitions shall be made of the respective States to 
pay . . . their respective quotas, . . . and in case of any of the States failing to 
comply with such requisitions, then, and then only, to devise and pass 
acts . . . authorizing the collection of the same.”226  This motion was 
 
218 Id. at 1233–34. 
219 See generally MADISON, supra note 132 (recording the lengthy debates among the delegates 
regarding the contents of the proposed draft). 
220 Id. at 1263. 
221 Id. at 1264. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 1265. 
224 Id. at 1339 (emphasis omitted). 
225 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
226 Id. at 1382. 
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defeated,227 although the concept would later become popular with the Anti-
federalists.228 
The tax provisions were slightly revised with no recorded comments until 
the final discussions concerning the draft that had been prepared by the 
Committee on Style.  In that draft, Congress had the power “[t]o lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.”229  That power was subject only to 
the limitations that Congress could not enact a “tax or duty . . . on articles 
exported from any State,” that “[n]o capitation or other direct tax shall be 
laid, unless in proportion to the census,” and that “[r]epresentatives and 
direct taxes shall be apportioned.”230  Madison’s notes say that the language 
“‘but all such duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the 
United States’ [was] unanimously annexed to the power of taxation,” but he 
did not say why that addition was requested.231  Additionally, George Read of 
Delaware proposed adding the words “or other direct tax” after “capitation” 
because, as Madison wrote somewhat cryptically in his notes, “[h]e was afraid 
that some liberty might otherwise be taken to saddle the States with a 
readjustment, by this rule, of past requisitions of Congress; and that his 
amendment, by giving another cast to the meaning, would take away the 
pretext.”232  This change was adopted233 and, within days, the Constitution 
was completed and became the subject of intense political debate, only a 
very small part of which touched on excise taxes. 
Convention delegate Luther Martin became one of the leaders of the 
group of people who have come to be called the Anti-federalists, who sought 
either to defeat ratification or to require amendments.  Martin was worried 
in particular that imposts would “impose duties on any or every article of 
 
227 See id.  Even two of Martin’s fellow Maryland delegates (Carroll and Jenifer) voted against 
it.  Id. 
228 See The Ratifications of the Twelve States, in 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 319, 322–23 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION] (including the content of this motion as a suggested constitutional 
amendment within the ratification statement issued by Massachusetts); id. at 325 (same 
regarding South Carolina); id. at 325–26 (New Hampshire); id. at 327, 329 (New York); 
id. at 336 (Rhode Island); Debates of the Convention of the State of North Carolina on 
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 245 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (North Carolina); The 
Virginia Convention, June 27, 1788, in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1550, 1556 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993) 
(Virginia). 
229 MADISON, supra note 132, at 1611. 
230 Id. at 1606, 1613. 
231 Id. at 1575.  Madison does not say who made this proposal.  Id. 
232 Id. at 1579.  Williamson seconded the motion, according to Madison’s notes, and there 
was no further discussion.  See id. 
233 Id. 
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commerce imported into these states;” meanwhile, “[b]y the power to lay 
excises, . . . the Congress may impose duties on every article of use or 
consumption, on the food that we eat, on the liquors that we drink, on the 
clothes that we wear, the glass which enlightens our houses, or the hearths 
necessary for our warmth and comfort.”234  These taxes, in Martin’s view, 
would give the federal government “a power very odious in its nature, since 
it authorizes officers to go into your houses, your kitchens, your cellars, and 
to examine into your private concerns.”235  Martin thus appears to have had 
a fairly clear understanding of the nature of excise taxes, including their use 
in Britain not only to tax the sale of domestically produced commodities 
(“the food that we eat” and “the liquors that we drink”236) but also the 
possession of certain household items (“the glass which enlightens our 
houses, or the hearths necessary for our warmth and comfort.)”237 
While Martin wrote quite knowledgeably, another Anti-federalist, calling 
himself “A Farmer and Planter,” noted that “[e]xcise is a new thing in 
America, and few country farmers and planters know the meaning of it.”238  
It is much better known, he explained, “in Old England, where I have seen 
the effects of it . . . . It is there a duty, or tax, laid upon almost every 
necessary of life and convenience, and a great number of other articles.”239  
The excise extended not only to the purchase of things such as salt and rum 
(and here he recalls the “detestable” excise rates in England from twenty-six 
years earlier, such was the degree to which he “felt the smart”240), but it also 
meant that “[i]f a private family make their own soap, candles, beer, cider, 
&c.[,] &c.[,] they pay an excise-duty on them.”241  Another Antifederalist, 
writing in New York as “A Countryman,” echoes the point that the concept 
of excise taxes was not well known among those in the backcountry.  What 
they had heard, however, was that it was a very broad tax.  He writes that 
“some of our neighbors from the old countries, where they say, [excises] are 
as common as Mayweed[,] tell us that they will go to almost every thing.”242 
Although a number of Anti-federalists acknowledged the reasonableness 
of “external taxes, [which] are impost duties . . . laid on imported goods,” in 
 
234 Luther Martin’s Letter of the Federal Convention of 1787, in 1 THE DEBATES ON THE 




238 Essay by A Farmer and Planter, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 74, 75 (Herbert J. 
Storing ed., 1981). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id.  He then goes on to describe the evils of excise tax collectors, “who are the very scurf 
and refuse of mankind.”  Id. 
242 Letters from a Countryman, in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 69, 79 (Herbert J. 
Storing ed., 1981). 
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the words of the influential Federal Farmer,243 “internal taxes, as poll and 
land taxes, excises, duties on all written instruments, etc. may fix themselves 
on every person and species of property in the community; they may be 
carried to any lengths.”244  The lengths to which those excises could go can 
be seen in comments by Federalist Oliver Ellsworth at Connecticut’s 
ratifying convention.  After describing the various methods by which 
European countries raise revenues, Ellsworth points out that “[i]n Holland 
their prodigious taxes . . . are levied chiefly upon articles of consumption.  
They excise every thing, not excepting even their houses of infamy.”245 
The fact that excise taxes frequently fell on manufactured goods 
occasioned a number of additional comments, both pro and con.  General 
James Wadsworth, speaking at the Connecticut ratifying convention, 
“objected against imposts and excises because their operation would be 
partial and in favor of the Southern states.”246  Meanwhile, in states with 
agrarian economies, an excise on manufactured goods had the attractive 
feature of being borne primarily by others.  On January 18, 1788, a few 
months before the state ratifying convention, Charles Pinckney addressed 
the South Carolina legislature.247  In speaking about the excise provision in 
Article I, Pinckney noted:  “as to excises, when it is considered how many 
more excisable articles are manufactured to the northward than there are to 
the southward, . . . he thought every man would see the propriety . . . of this 
clause.”248 
 
243 Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by 
the Late Convention; And to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It.  In a 
Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 214, 239 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter Federal Farmer]; see also 
Letters of Agrippa, in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 68, 113 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 
1981); Essays of an Old Whig, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 17, 39, 40 (Herbert J. 
Storing ed., 1981). 
244 Federal Farmer, supra note 243, at 239. 
245 Fragment of the Debates in the Convention of the State of Connecticut on the Adoption 
of the Federal Constitution, in 2 THE DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 195, 190–97 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). 
246 James Wadsworth, Speech in the Connecticut State Ratification Convention (Jan. 7, 
1788), in 2 BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 81 (Jon 
L. Wakelyn ed., 2004). 
247 Debates in the Legislature and in Convention of the State of South Carolina on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 253, 300 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).  The South Carolina 
legislature first considered the proposed Constitution within the legislature before voting 
to assemble in convention in May.  The vote to convene a convention was approved by 
the slightest of margins, 76-75.  Pinckney, who had been a delegate at the federal 
convention, was elected President of the South Carolina ratifying convention.  Id. at 316–
18. 
248 Id. at 306. 
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The other side of the coin can be seen in the comments of Charles 
Livingston, Chancellor of New York, when he addressed the convention on 
July 1, 1788 about a proposed constitutional amendment to the effect 
“[t]hat the Congress do not impose any excise on any article (ardent spirits 
excepted) of the growth, production, or manufacture of the United States, 
or any of them.”249  Livingston’s concern was that manufacturing was the 
future of America, and the excise would grow with the economy.  He stated: 
[O]ne word with respect to excise.  When I addressed the committee on 
Friday last, I observed, that the amendment would operate with great 
inconvenience; that at a future period this would be a manufacturing 
country; and then there would be many proper objects of excise.250 
The ratification debates of the New York convention were accompanied 
by the publication of the Federalist Papers, which provide interesting insights 
into how Hamilton—not yet responsible for raising revenue for the new 
federal government—described the future use of the power to tax.  
Hamilton’s Federalist 12 begins by observing that the “prosper[ity of] 
commerce is . . . acknowledged . . . to be the most useful, as well as the most 
productive, source of national wealth; and has accordingly become a 
primary object of their political cares.”251  When it comes to raising revenue, 
in “so opulent a nation as that of Britain . . . direct taxes, from superior 
wealth, must be . . . much more practicable, than in America,” yet most 
revenue comes from “taxes of the indirect kind; from imposts and from 
excises.  Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter 
description.”252  For the new American nation, he argued, “we must a long 
time depend . . . chiefly on such duties.”253  Moreover, “excises must be 
confined within a narrow compass.  The genius of the people will illy brook 
the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws.”254  Hamilton then noted 
that “[t]he pockets of the farmers . . . will reluctantly yield but scanty 
supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; 
 
249 The Ratifications of the Twelve States, in 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 319, 329 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). 
250 The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 
in 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 14, 310, 362 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). 
251 THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 55 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
252 Id. at 56–57; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. 
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (noting that “taxes . . . may be sub-divided into 
those of the direct, and those of the indirect kind.  Though the objection be made to both, 
yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch.  And indeed as to 
the latter, by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of consumption, 
one is at a loss to conceive, what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended”). 
253 THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 251, at 57. 
254 Id. 
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and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold 
of in any other way, than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on 
consumption.”255  After a strong argument in favor of duties on importation, 
especially on the “four millions of gallons” of “ardent spirits” estimated to 
arrive on American shores each year, Hamilton returns to his effort to 
minimize the likely effect of excises, which “are too little in unison with the 
feelings of the people, to admit of great use . . . nor, indeed, in the States 
where almost the sole employment is agriculture, are the objects proper for 
excise sufficiently numerous, to permit very ample collections in that way.”256 
In a subsequent essay, Hamilton returns to the fact that the new nation 
will need to raise revenue, and he specifically addresses the alternate 
proposal that any needed revenue would be requisitioned from the states, 
which would be solely responsible for taxation.  In Federalist 21, Hamilton 
writes that the “[i]mposts, excises, and in general all duties upon articles of 
consumption . . . . contain in their own nature a security against excess.”257  
Hamilton’s implication in both papers is that excises were narrowly confined 
to “articles of consumption”258 where they would be absorbed in the price of 
the goods, and thus “imperceptible.”259  Moreover, the “amount to be 
contributed by each citizen will . . . be at his own option . . . . The rich may 
be extravagant . . . the poor can be frugal:  and private oppression may 
always be avoided, by a judicious selection of objects proper for such 
impositions.”260  And so, for the Hamilton of the Federalist, excise taxes will 
be infrequently and judiciously employed, so as to be 
“imperceptible . . . taxes on consumption,”261 and drawn with due care for 
the separate concerns of the rich and poor. 
The Constitution’s taxation clauses ultimately emerged unchanged from 
the ratification process.  Despite Anti-federalist concerns about excises, 
“direct taxes,” in contrast to “duties, imposts, and excises,” were especially 
controversial.262  Even after ratification, Anti-federalist Thomas Tudor 
Tucker introduced into the First Congress an amendment that read, “[t]he 
Congress shall never impose direct taxes but where the moneys arising from 
 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 59. 
257 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 102–03 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
258 Id. at 102. 
259 THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 251. 
260 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 257, at 103. 
261 THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 251. 
262 See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1133 (1971) 
(“Mr. Tucker moved the following as a proposition to be added to [the amendments to 
the Constitution]:  The Congress shall never impose direct taxes but where the moneys 
arising from the duties, imposts, and excise are insufficient for the public 
exigencies. . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the duties, imposts, and excise are insufficient for the public 
exigencies, . . . then . . . Congress [should make] a requisition upon the 
States to assess, levy, and pay their respective proportions . . . .”263  Livermore 
“thought this an amendment of more importance than any yet obtained; 
that it was recommended by five or six states,”264 but it was defeated thirty-
nine to nine.265  The new nation was thus empowered “[t]o lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” subject to the requirements that direct 
taxes be apportioned, and “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States.”266 
In summary, throughout the constitutional debates, we can see that 
those opposing extensive federal power—mostly the Anti-federalists—
employed broad definitions of “excise,” a semantic choice that allowed them 
to emphasize their fears of an unrestrained national taxing power.  On the 
other hand, Federalists argued for narrow definitions and predicted limited 
and prudent use of the federal power of taxation.  After the Constitution was 
ratified, however, the positions were reversed:  Hamilton and other 
nationalists promoted expansive definitions that would give the government 
greater power, while the Virginians in Hylton sought narrow, more technical 
meanings in the hopes of deflating that power.  Once again, simply 
surveying contemporary usage provides no direct guidance as to which is the 
correct meaning of the constitutional text, in substantial part because the 
people using those terms pushed their meanings in one direction or 
another in their efforts to promote particular political outcomes on specific 
occasions. 
3.  Congress 
The 1791 debate in the First Congress surrounding the imposition of 
excise taxes on “spirits” is the most substantive discussion of the excise that 
can be found in the congressional records prior to the discussion of the 
carriage tax.  Hamilton, then serving as Secretary of the Treasury, was not as 
reluctant to impose excise taxes as he had appeared to be in the Federalist.  
Hamilton proposed a federal tax on whiskey to provide revenue to pay off 
 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 1134. 
265 Id. at 1137. 
266 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States . . . .”); id. at § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes 
shall be apportioned among the several States . . . .”). 
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the large Revolutionary War debt.267  It is frequently described as the 
“Whiskey Excise,” although the statutory language used the word “duties.”  
The proposed bill would have repealed “the duties heretofore laid on 
distilled spirits imported from abroad, and laying others in their stead, and 
also upon spirits distilled within the United States.”268  The “others” thus 
appear to be understood as excises since the entire debate over the 
imposition of the new duties centered on the excise. 
The most interesting passages are those taken from Congressman James 
Jackson of Georgia, who ardently opposed the new excises on spirits.  In a 
speech on January 5, 1791, Jackson derided the excise as being “odious, 
unequal, unpopular, and oppressive, more particularly in the Southern 
States.”269  Jackson had studied the history of the excise and its development 
over time.  During the same January 5 proceedings, he “gave a short sketch 
of the history of excises in England.  He said they always had been 
considered by the people of that country as an odious tax, from the time of 
Oliver Cromwell to the present day; even Blackstone, a high prerogative 
lawyer, has reprobated them.”270  Both sides of the debate over the excise bill 
in 1791 seemed to be familiar with this history and employed it in advancing 
their positions. 
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire spoke in support of the whiskey 
excise, saying that the people “will consider it as drinking down the national 
debt.”271  Livermore believed that the objections to the bill “arose principally 
from the word excise,” and tried to distinguish the spirits bill from the 
“unequal” excises of the past.272  His explanation was that an excise 
traditionally taxed the population unequally “inasmuch as it fell on the poor 
only, who were obliged to purchase in small quantities; while the rich, by 
storing their cellars, escaped the duty.”273  After Sedgwick of Massachusetts 
rather optimistically sought to set his colleagues’ minds at ease by assuring 
them “that he did not contemplate the execution of the [excise] laws by 
military force,” William Smith of South Carolina also tried to show “in what 
 
267 When Congress asked Hamilton for a funding plan to pay for assuming state debts, his 
report was not limited to whiskey:  Hamilton “responded with a report outlining further 
increases in the import duties, a carriage tax, a tobacco excise, federal legal licenses and 
stamp taxes, levies on auction sales, and taxes on the retail sale of wines and liquors.”  
William D. Barber, “Among the Most Techy Articles of Civil Police”:  Federal Taxation and the 
Adoption of the Whiskey Excise, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 58, 74 & n.47 (1968). 
268 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 272 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1857). 
269 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1890 (1791) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 262 
(1857). 
270 2 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 269, at 1890–91 (emphasis omitted). 
271 Id. at 1896. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
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respects [the bill] differed from the English plan of an excise” in its 
specifics, including the opportunity for trial by jury.274 
Three years later, in 1794, the Third Congress’s debate over the carriage 
tax took place in the midst of a broader discussion of various proposed 
taxes, including an excise tax on the manufacture of tobacco.  Although 
Virginia’s representatives were unhappy with both the carriage tax and the 
tobacco tax, most likely because the economic burden of both would fall 
heavily on Virginia and other southern states, they appeared not to contest 
the issue of whether the tobacco tax was properly called an “excise,” whereas 
they refused to put the carriage tax in the same category.  As to the tobacco 
tax, the debate was focused primarily on questions of tax policy:  Madison 
made a point of distinguishing between “direct personal taxes, and those 
raised by indirect means, such as excise and customs.”275  Quoting “an 
author of respectable character, in England,” Madison noted that indirect 
taxes were much more expensive to collect,276 often because 
“dealers . . . endeavored to evade the duties, and thus commences a struggle, 
which has many bad effects, both upon industry and public morals.”277 
As the debate shifted to an excise on sugar, representatives from states 
involved in sugar manufacturing rose to make similar arguments about the 
evils of the excise, generally focusing on the intrusive methods needed to 
collect them.278  Virginia’s Nicholas sought to make common cause with 
them by saying that “the excise system . . . was, at best, from its essence, 
inseparably connected with vexation, . . . [and] of false informations for 
smuggling.”279  Direct taxes, he argued, “were the best, both as being the 
least expense in the collection, and as tending more than any others, to 
keep the attention of the people strictly fixed on the way in which their 
money shall be expended.”280 
Despite the appearance of the provision for excise taxes in the 
Constitution, Congressmen Smilie and Findley both spoke of excise taxes as, 
in Smilie’s words, “contrary to the spirit of the Constitution of a free 
country, and in opposition to the Constitution of the United States.”281  
These comments appear to be broad-based rhetorical arguments about the 
 
274 Id. at 1897–98. 
275 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 630 (1894) (Joseph Gales & Winston Seaton eds., 1849). 
276 Id. (pointing to a difference of three percent for “direct taxes . . . such as the land tax” 
and thirty percent for indirect taxes). 
277 Id. at 631. 
278 Id. at 636–38. 
279 Id. at 638. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 637.  This statement came after he read a long quotation from Blackstone about the 
broad powers given to excise officers in England.  Id.  Findley called excises “inconsistent 
with personal liberty, and the spirit of the American Constitution.”  Id. at 638. 
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likely effect of excise taxes rather than an effort at constitutional 
interpretation bearing on the direct-versus-indirect tax constitutional issue, 
as it was raised in Hylton.  That particular issue came up later with a lengthy 
debate between Massachusetts congressman Sedgwick and Virginia’s 
Nicholas. 
The records of Nicholas’s remarks are limited, but his argument was 
summarized by Congressman Dexter:  “[A] gentleman from Virginia [Mr. 
Nicholas] thought the meaning was, that all taxes are direct which are paid 
by the citizen without being recompensed by the consumer; but that, where 
the tax was only advanced and repaid by the consumer, the tax was 
indirect.”282  In contrast, Sedgwick believed that “there had been a general 
concurrence in a belief that . . . . a capitation tax and taxes on land and on 
property and income generally, were direct charges . . . . He had considered 
those, and those only, as direct taxes.”283  Meanwhile, Sedgwick “had never 
supposed” that “a tax imposed on a specific article of personal property, and 
particularly if objects of luxury . . . had been considered a direct tax, within 
the meaning of the Constitution.”284  To discover that “pleasure carriages 
and other objects of luxury were excepted from contributing to the public 
exigencies,” observed Sedgwick, would “astonish the people of America.”285  
Yet, this exemption would undoubtedly occur under Nicholas’s definitions, 
since “several of the States had few or no carriages,” and thus, 
“apportionment could not be made and the duty . . . could not be 
imposed.”286  In case of any doubt, Sedgwick argued that it would not be “the 
just construction” of the Constitution to limit Congress’s ability “to impose 
taxes on every subject of revenue.”287 
Congressman Murray admitted that “the terms in the Constitution, 
direct and indirect taxes, had never conveyed very distinct or definite ideas 
to his mind,” but, on balance, “he thought the tax on pleasure carriages a 
good one.”288  After wrestling with the various arguments, Murray concluded 
that since ownership of carriages was so different among the various states, 
apportionment would be virtually impossible.289  In the end, he was 
persuaded that owning a carriage was comparable to owning a still, and he 
 
282 Id. at 646. 
283 Id. at 644. 
284 Id.  He noted that the “exaction was indeed directly of the owner, but, by the equalizing 
operation, of which all taxes more or less partook, it created an indirect charge on others 
besides the owners.”  Id. 
285 Id. at 644–45. 
286 Id. at 645. 
287 Id. at 644. 
288 Id. at 652. 
289 Id. at 652–53. 
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would rely on the widely accepted “argument that the tax on stills was an 
indirect one, [which] would equally prove the tax on coaches such.”290 
When the carriage tax came to a final vote in the House, there was 
another brief debate on its constitutionality.  Madison “objected to this tax 
on carriages as an unconstitutional tax; and, as an unconstitutional measure, 
he would vote against it.”291  Ames from Massachusetts responded that “it was 
not to be wondered at if he, coming from so different a part of the country, 
should have a different idea of this tax . . . .”292  For those living in his state, 
“this tax had been long known; and there it was called an excise.”293  The 
Congress then voted, and the carriage tax was adopted by a vote of forty-nine 
to twenty-two.294 
II.  NEW PROBLEM, OLD SOLUTION 
Our seemingly simple goal in this analysis was to review the 
understanding of the term “excise” at the time the Constitution was adopted 
to consider whether Justice Chase was correct in Hylton when he said that 
Article I, Section 8, gave Congress a “general power . . . to lay and collect 
taxes of every kind or nature, without any restraint,”295 or whether, as the 
Virginians argued, the original understanding of the term “excise” was 
limited to a type of sales tax on transactions involving commodities or 
manufactured goods.  What we learned was that credible sources can be 
found to support opposite conclusions, and that the original meaning 
depends on which sources are deemed authoritative.  The two principal 
authors of The Federalist expressed diametrically opposite views, not only on 
the substantive issue of national power but also on the narrow issue of what 
“excise” means.  The Founding Era dictionaries and commentaries point in 
one direction, while there are well-known examples of much broader 
usages—including both British and American statutory language—pointing 
in the other. 
This array of inconsistent uses of the key constitutional language creates 
a methodological conundrum for New Originalists quite similar to the 
“summing” problem they have linked with Old Originalism.  Broadly 
speaking, the question is what to do with too much evidence pointing in too 
many directions.  This phenomenon of a multiplicity of potential meanings 
of words or phrases is ancient and well known.  In particular, it has provoked 
 
290 Id. at 653. 




295 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 171 (1796) (Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
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battles among the professional lexicographers who compile dictionary 
definitions:  Should a dictionary specify “proper” or correct usage (and if so, 
how should a dictionary writer decide what that is?), or should it more 
comprehensively represent the full range of evidence of the actual use of the 
word?  Traditionally, prescriptivists have opted for the former, descriptivists 
have chosen the latter; it appears that the descriptivists currently have the 
upper hand in professional lexicographic circles.296  But which course 
should the Supreme Court take? 
It is not clear that New Originalists who insist on a strict rejection of 
original intent have the theoretical tools with which to resolve the 
conundrum created by having legitimate sources of original textual meaning 
pointing to the likelihood of multiple public meanings that are inconsistent 
with each other.297  A hypothetical, well-informed ratifier could have had the 
New England usage of “excise” in mind, or he could have shared the 
Virginians’ more prescriptive views, or, perhaps the truly hypothetical, really 
well-informed ratifier would know that people in Massachusetts understood 
 
296 See, e.g., SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES:  THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 174–225 
(2d ed. 2001); JACK LYNCH, THE LEXICOGRAPHER’S DILEMMA:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
“PROPER” ENGLISH FROM SHAKESPEARE TO SOUTH PARK (2009); David Foster Wallace, Tense 
Present:  Democracy, English, and the Wars Over Usage, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Apr. 2001, at 39, 
44–45; see also Johnson, supra note 36, at 66 (“Sometimes one looks to the dictionary for a 
unique definitional answer.  We might legitimately ask, for instance, for a unique yes or 
no answer as to whether ‘direct tax’ excluded ‘excises.’  The answer unfortunately is not 
lexicographic.  Both definitions of ‘direct tax’ to include and to exclude ‘excise’ were 
used publicly in debates at the time of the Constitution without any objection . . . that the 
terms were misused.”); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress:  Definitional 
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915 (2010); 
Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:  The United 
States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999).  
297 This is not to say that New Originalists are unwilling to prioritize sources.  See, e.g., 
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1165 (noting that “not all early American precedents 
are created equal”).  They identify as the best evidence of the “original, objective public 
meaning,” id. at 1132 (emphasis omitted), “the meaning the language . . . would have 
had . . . to an average, informed speaker and reader of that language at the time.”  Id. at 
1133 (quoting Van Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 291, 398 (2002)).  This meaning is best shown when it is “clear on direct 
evidence,” id. at 1133 (quoting Kesavan & Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, supra, 
at 398), but “second- and third-best evidence [can be used] . . . in accordance with a 
reasonably strict hierarchy of interpreted sources, principles, and canons.”  Id.  Kesavan 
and Paulsen’s hierarchy is based primarily on their conclusion that “Founding-era 
sources, which constitute the legislative history of the framing and adoption of the 
Constitution, deserve more interpretive weight than the post-Founding sources, which 
constitute the ‘post-enactment legislative history’ of the Constitution, because the 
Founding-era sources are more contemporaneous expositions of original meaning.”  Id. 
at 1180 (footnote omitted).  Our point is that, in this case, the potential win-place-and-
show evidence points in multiple directions, even within the Kesavan and Paulsen 
categories (i.e., there are conflicting accounts within both the Founding-era and post-
Founding era sources), thus leaving the textual meaning potentially indeterminate. 
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the term differently than their contemporaries in Virginia.  The modern 
Court could lean toward “proper” usage, thus giving the methodological 
nod to prescriptivists such as Samuel Johnson or William Blackstone, but 
that may still require them to choose which source is most authoritative.  
That judgment could be something like, “William Blackstone is a more 
important source than Samuel Johnson,” although it is hard to know why 
one eighteenth-century English source is better or worse than another at 
predicting what a hypothetical American ratifier might have thought.298  Any 
such judgment increases the risk that the justice will lean toward the most 
desirable source, as in “Adam Smith’s usage better aligns with my policy 
preferences than Sir James Steuart’s.” 
The Court could follow instead many modern philosophers of language 
and adopt a descriptivist New Originalism, leading it to focus on all of the 
ways the words may have been used at the time of the Founding, although it 
is not clear how a broad-based descriptivism, which would count all uses 
essentially as equals, would help a court choose one over another.  The 
descriptivist challenge to New Originalism is thus that it requires a justice to 
choose among multiple possibilities with no theoretical basis for that choice.  
To solve this problem, the Court could follow Justice Paterson’s lead and—
perhaps just in tie-breaking cases—let the intentions of the constitutional 
Framers be the ultimate authority for determining the meaning of the text.  
That is, when the meaning must be sought outside the four corners of the 
 
298 These sources were not discussed in Kesavan and Paulsen’s hierarchy.  See id. at 1148 
n.128.  One could imagine differentiating between sources based on how widely 
circulated and well-known they were, but it does not appear that this method of 
differentiation is available to New Originalists appealing to the hypothetical ratifier.  After 
all, if the assumption of New Originalism is that the hypothetical ratifier is “reasonably 
well-informed,” it is hard to know how widely a particular source need have circulated 
before a “reasonably well-informed” person alive at the Founding would have become 
familiar with the source.  See id. at 1132.  One might reasonably worry that the answer to 
this question will depend on whether the judge deciding a case desires that the source in 
question be part of the hypothetical ratifier’s library (or not) so that the judge can 
achieve a particular result.  That a source’s popularity is irrelevant within Kesavan and 
Paulsen’s hierarchy is confirmed by their argument that “it does not matter whether a 
particular source of constitutional meaning is private (and hence invisible to the 
Ratifiers) under an original public meaning approach to constitutional interpretation.”  
Id. at 1183.  By contrast, if New Originalism did not presuppose a hypothetical ratifier, 
and instead based its analysis on what people alive at the time actually knew and said—even 
if the majority of them were not reasonably well-informed—then ranking sources 
according to their circulation becomes a potentially plausible solution, since the focus 
shifts to discovering what sources people actually knew of and were familiar with.  
Different methods of ranking could, however, lead to different outcomes.  In the case of 
the word “excise,” for example, the broad Massachusetts usage could dominate because 
of the greater use of the term through annual taxation of the populace, whereas under a 
different methodology, Virginia’s narrow usage could be chosen because the population 
of Virginia was greater than that of Massachusetts. 
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constitutional text, why not opt for answering the question “what were the 
Framers actually trying to accomplish in using this language?” rather than 
letting Samuel Johnson (an eighteenth-century English lexicographer) or 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (a twentieth-century German philosopher) make the 
final determination? 
When confronted with these questions of interpretive methodology, 
Justice Paterson set aside the objective “semantic” arguments because they 
did not lead to a clear textual answer; as he put it, they “turn in a circle.”299  
He looked specifically to the “framers,” and focused directly on “the reason 
of introducing the clause in the Constitution.”300  Although leading New 
Originalists have argued that the Constitution “does not generally designate 
a body of persons who are authorized, by virtue of their station, to 
determine with finality the Constitution’s meaning,”301 Justice Paterson does 
just that in defaulting to the intentions of the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention when “semantics” simply were not able to supply a clear 
answer.302 
 
299 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 176 (Paterson, J.). 
300 Id. at 177.  By citing the justices’ invocation of the Framers’ intent, we do not take a 
position on whether they accurately described that intent.  Our point is that, as a matter 
of interpretive methodology, the justices—and Justice Paterson, in particular—sought to 
resolve an indeterminate result that followed a textualist analysis by using an 
intentionalist approach.  That being said, Currie points out that “[w]hat little the 
[Convention] debates reveal about direct taxes tends to support the Hylton decision.”  
CURRIE, supra note 3, at 36 n.40.  Currie nevertheless accuses the justices of merely 
following “their own policy preferences.”  Id. at 37.  This accusation has been made about 
justices adopting just about every possible interpretive methodology.  Our point relates to 
the rationale expressed by the justices—that is, the extent to which they seek to make an 
argument in their opinions about which constitutional meaning should be followed.  In 
this case, Justice Paterson constructed a methodological argument that the Framers’ 
intention could resolve disputes over the objective public meaning of the constitutional 
text. 
301 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1168 (quoting Gary Lawson, On Reading 
Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1835 (1997)). 
302 Even if the Court were to defer to the Legislature, these methodological issues may not 
disappear.  For an argument that Congress should employ originalism, see generally Joel 
Alicea, Originalism and the Legislature, 56 LOY. L. REV. 513 (2010); Joel Alicea, An Originalist 
Congress?, NAT’L AFF., Winter 2011, at 32.  If Congress was originalist, it would run into 
some of the same methodological issues.  See Joel Alicea, Note, Stare Decisis in an 
Originalist Congress, 35 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 797 (2012).  The New Textualists propose 
that, in cases of statutory interpretation, “purpose” can be invoked to resolve this sort of 
indeterminacy.  Id. at 803 n.33, 816.  Whether such an approach parallels Justice 
Paterson’s use of the intent of the members of the Constitutional Convention depends 
largely on how broadly “purpose” (and evidence of purpose) is interpreted.  If the inquiry 
into the purpose of the constitutional provisions relating to “direct taxes” and “excises” is 
answered by saying, “[t]he purpose was to establish the extent of the federal taxing 
power,” then “purpose” will not resolve the question in Hylton.  (It would be useful, in 
another type of case, to tell us that the Second Amendment is about guns rather than 
short-sleeved shirts.)  If the purpose of the taxation clauses is understood more 
 
1210 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
Even if there is a clear picture of the intentions of the Convention 
delegates, can New Originalists become comfortable with an Old 
Originalism solution to this kind of semantic conundrum?  If not, it is not 
clear how a Hylton-like case involving an indeterminate meaning of the 
constitutional text can be resolved.  Limiting the analysis to the text and 
contemporary word usage will require choosing one meaning over another 
arguably equally good meaning, and will subject an ostensibly objective 
interpretive methodology to the risk that judges will be inclined to select the 
meaning that leads to the outcome that is most in line with their preferred 
policy choices. 
There may, however, be a rationale by which New Originalists could 
potentially embrace at least this limited application of Old Originalism.  
Much as the New Textualists will, when necessary, look to the purpose of a 
law, the New Originalists could open their inquiry at least as far as to asking 
what the ratifiers were trying to accomplish with the text in question.303  And 
the records of the Philadelphia Convention may have more bearing on that 
question than New Originalists have recognized to date.  Typically, New 
Originalists have argued that the Constitutional Convention had no law-
making authority, and therefore, the delegates’ understanding of the 
language is not relevant.  As Kesavan and Paulsen have written, it was only 
“the action of the Constitution’s Ratifiers . . . whose actions gave legal life to 
the otherwise dead words on paper drafted by the Philadelphia 
Convention.”304  There are, however, arguments in favor of considering 
documentary evidence of the Convention’s compromises as carrying greater 
interpretive weight than being merely an irrelevant historical background to 
the inking of “dead words on paper.”305 
 
specifically to mean something on the order of, “[t]o maximize the reach of federal 
taxing power subject only to narrow, heavily negotiated limitations designed to placate 
the outhern states,” then it becomes essentially the same as what we and Justice Paterson 
are calling “intent.” 
303 Given the intellectual kinship between New Originalism and New Textualism, see supra 
note 25, this result would hardly be novel. After all, where statutory language is 
ambiguous and the ambiguity cannot be resolved by resort to non-purposive sources, 
“textualists think it quite appropriate to resolve that ambiguity in light of the statute’s 
apparent overall purpose.”  Manning, supra note 26, at 84.  As Professor Manning points 
out, “[t]o be sure, textualists generally forgo reliance on legislative history as an 
authoritative source of such purpose, but that reaction goes to the reliability and 
legitimacy of a certain type of evidence of purpose rather than to the use of purpose as 
such.”  Id.  For New Originalists who find themselves growing queasy at the thought of 
resorting to original intent, it is important to keep in mind the analogy to New 
Textualism in the statutory context, see supra note 25, and its willingness to examine 
legislative purposes where the text provides no clear answer. 
304 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1137 (emphasis omitted). 
305 Id. 
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Perhaps the most powerful reason for looking more seriously at the views 
of the Convention delegates is that most of them were also ratifiers.  There 
were Convention delegates active in every state ratifying convention except 
Rhode Island, which did not send delegates to the Convention in the first 
place.306  Several of these delegate-ratifiers were among the most prominent 
public figures of the constitutional debates.  They included the writers of 
widely reprinted essays on behalf of the Federalists, such as Hamilton and 
Madison, as well as the Anti-federalists, such as George Mason and Luther 
Martin.307  In fact, Luther Martin’s very long and widely distributed 
pamphlet was originally a speech to the Maryland Legislature in which he 
reported in detail on the proceedings of the Convention.308  The 30,000-
word pamphlet was titled, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of 
the State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately 
Held at Philadelphia, and it was reprinted in a number of newspapers.309  
Although the Genuine Information lacks the transcription-like reporting of 
Madison’s notes, Martin describes proposals, objections, and compromises 
in a manner that allowed his many readers to obtain a good sense of the 
Convention’s discussions (albeit one tinged with strong Anti-federalist 
sympathies).310  Its breadth of distribution during the ratification period can 
be seen in the fact “Anti-Federalist authors as different as Columbian Patriot 
(Mercy Otis Warren of Massachusetts) and Centinel (likely to be Samuel 
 
306 See FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, 2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 15 
(1901); id. at 34 (Connecticut—William Samuel Johnson, Roger Sherman, and Oliver 
Ellsworth); id. at 18 & n.2 (Delaware—George Read, Gunning Bedford, Jr., and Richard 
Bassett); id. at 33 (Georgia—William Few); id. at 57 (Maryland—James McHenry, Luther 
Martin and John F. Mercer); id. at 38 (Massachusetts—Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King, 
and Caleb Strong); id. at 73 (New Hampshire—John Langdon); id. at 32 (New Jersey—
David Brearly); id. at 134–35, 139 (New York—Alexander Hamilton, John Lansing, Jr., 
and Robert Yates); id. at 181 (North Carolina—William Blount, Richard Dobbs Spaight, 
Hugh Williamson, and William R. Davie); id. at 21 (Pennsylvania—James Wilson); id. at 
69 (South Carolina—John Rutledge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Charles 
Pinckney); id. at 83 (Virginia—John Blair, James Madison, Jr., George Mason, Edmund J. 
Randolph, and George Wythe).  Thus, nearly 60% of the Convention delegates were 
ratifiers. 
307 Three of the four most widely reprinted essays written by individual Anti-federalists were 
penned by Convention delegates Elbridge Gerry, who was invited to attend the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention, and two delegate-ratifiers, George Mason and 
Edmund Randolph.  SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS:  ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE 
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 309 (1999). 
308 See Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland 
(1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 238, at 19. 
309 Id. 
310 Kesavan and Paulsen note that “Luther Martin’s Letter revealed no small portion of the 
hitherto secret proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention—including the drafting 
history (in some detail) of various clauses.”  Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1152 
n.143. 
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Bryan of Pennsylvania) each referred to Martin’s Genuine Information when 
discussing the Philadelphia Convention.”311 
In addition to these Federalist and Anti-federalist authors, very active 
participants in the state ratification debates included future Supreme Court 
Justices Oliver Ellsworth in Connecticut, who wrote the widely reprinted 
“Letters of a Landholder,”312 John Rutledge in South Carolina, and James 
Wilson in Pennsylvania.  In states where ratification was heavily debated, the 
prominent men who had been Convention delegates were, not surprisingly, 
very influential participants.  Meanwhile, a number of states, such as 
Georgia, New Jersey, and Delaware overwhelmingly and rapidly approved 
the Constitution,313 which may suggest that in some states the ratifiers were 
unlikely to have had dramatically different views about the constitutional 
text than their own states’ Convention delegates (at least absent evidence to 
the contrary).314 
It therefore could be reasonable, at least in difficult cases such as those 
discussed in this article, for even New Originalists to look to whether there is 
useful evidence of how the Convention delegates—and hence many key 
ratifiers—understood the meaning of the constitutional text (or at least the 
goal that text was designed to accomplish).  Doing so need not rest on a 
claim that the Convention had independent law-making authority but on 
the grounds that evidence of the views of the Convention delegates is, in 
fact, evidence of the views of many of the most influential ratifiers.  And, in 
the absence of any other way to choose between conflicting textual readings, 
the ratifiers’ goal in choosing the words could be a reasonable basis for 
determining their meaning. 
However, the specific views of the ratifiers will only be a reasonable way 
of resolving a Hylton-like New Originalist dilemma if there is sufficient 
documentary evidence to identify those views.  Whether that evidence exists 
 
311 See CORNELL, supra note 307, at 52 n.2; see also 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 146–50 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1984) (noting 
that Martin’s Genuine Information was available to ratifiers in at least Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina).  
It is worth noting that even if Martin’s information was inaccurate or incomplete, its 
existence (especially in light of its Anti-federalist orientation) was bound to stimulate 
discussion among the ratifiers as to the Convention debates, negotiations, and 
compromises.  For the “voluminous [n]ewspaper commentaries on Martin’s Genuine 
Information,” see id. at 149–50. 
312 See Donald S. Lutz, Connecticut:  Achieving Consent and Assuring Control, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION 117, 127 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch, eds., 1989) 
[hereinafter RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION]. 
313 See Pauline Maier, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 
97–124 (2010). 
314 For a discussion of the various state ratifying conventions, see generally id., and the state-
by-state essays in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 312. 
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is a factual question to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.  The “summing” 
problem will need to be confronted; and, with respect to that issue, it may be 
useful to note that Justice Paterson focused on the final result of a fairly 
extensive negotiation rather than on the intentions or desires of the 
individual participants in the various debates over taxation, representation, 
and slavery.  He did not describe the text as the sum of all of the arguments 
and proposals, but as representing the final negotiated compromise, a deal 
that probably did not fully satisfy any individual delegate or ratifier.315  The 
Constitution, noted Paterson, “was the effect of mutual sacrifices and 
concessions; it was the work of compromise.”316  The “natural and common, 
or technical and appropriate, meaning of the words . . . is not easy to 
ascertain,”317 but the nature of the “unfortunate compromise” could be 
determined by asking, essentially, what the Framers were trying to 
accomplish in describing the compromise they reached.  In this kind of case, 
where the text, read in light of all the tools in the New Originalists’ kit, leads 
to a semantic “tie,” it is at least conceivable that a sufficiently clear 
understanding of the provision’s meaning to the Framers can be found in 
the records of the Philadelphia Convention and the state ratifying 
conventions.  If such evidence exists in what could otherwise be a potential 
“coin-flipping” situation, Paterson’s version of Old Originalism may provide 
a reasonable way to resolve an otherwise indeterminate New Originalism 
analysis.  That is, if there are competing views of what a “hypothetical 
reasonably well-informed Ratifier would have objectively understood the 
legal text to mean,”318 the evidence of how actual ratifiers (as members of 
the Philadelphia Convention) understood the text could be at least prima 
facie evidence of what a hypothetical ratifier might have thought.319 
This brings us back to the second major drawback of Old Originalism—
that the Framers themselves rejected intentionalism as the correct method 
 
315 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 97 (1999) (“The process of negotiation and 
compromise that marked the framing process indicates that the authors of the 
Constitution were making efforts to unite behind a single text . . . . This is not to contend 
that all were satisfied with those changes but that such negotiated amendments create a 
presumption that all understood the language being used.”). 
316 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177–78 (1796) (Paterson, J.). 
317 Id. at 176. 
318 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1162. 
319 Some will nevertheless argue that discerning collective intention is conceptually 
impossible.  See Brest, supra note 14, at 214–15 (describing the critique of Max Radin’s 
collective intent idea, which was later adopted by Paul Brest).  Radin’s views 
notwithstanding, some continue to think collective intention is unproblematic as a 
theoretical matter.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 315, at 96 (“Analytically, the concept of 
collective intent creates no difficulties . . . . The real difficulty of collective intent is in its 
empirical discovery, not in its conceptual viability.”). 
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of constitutional interpretation.  Powell’s article is invariably cited for this 
proposition,320 although Robert Natelson has more recently argued to the 
contrary that a fuller review of the evidence shows that the “Founders’ 
hermeneutic—how they expected the Constitution to be construed—rested 
on the text, . . . but also on the subjective understanding of the ratifiers.”321  
There is, of course, a “summing” issue presented when asking whether the 
Framers believed in interpreting the Constitution based upon the Framers’ 
intentions.322  In lieu of attempting to resolve this issue in the abstract, we 
simply point out that at least one bona fide Framer, Justice Paterson, 
employed an argument based on the Framers’ intentions in his opinion in 
Hylton, and his brethren on the Court similarly used the language of 
intention.  And so, we can conclude that, at least some of the time, the 
Framers’ subjective intentions were invoked by some of the Framers even if 
we cannot reach a firm conclusion about the sum of the Framers.323 
It thus seems reasonable to consider that there may be cases where there 
is documentary evidence of what the Framers of a particular provision were 
trying to accomplish when they adopted the constitutional language.  
Whether that evidence exists is a factual issue, and the answer may differ 
based on both the clause and the controversy.  Similarly, the degree to 
which it is possible to identify a single, well-supported original public 
meaning is a factual issue that again may differ from case to case.  What 
Paterson’s opinion in Hylton suggests is that subjective understanding (Old 
Originalism) can fill a void created by a factual failure of New Originalism’s 
search for objective meaning.  We will leave for another day the question 
(perhaps hypothetical, perhaps not) of what to do if there is good evidence 
for both the Framers’ intentions and an objective public meaning, yet that 
evidence leads to two different original understandings—that is, if 
Originalism Old and New were to be inconsistent with each other. 
 
320 See supra text accompanying notes 17–23. 
321 Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic:  The Real Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1305 (2007). 
322 We find it perplexing that critics of Old Originalism would advance both the summing 
argument and the Framers-did-not-expect-intentionalism argument at the same time.  If 
one is true, it seems that the other is likely to be false, or at least unknowable. 
323 Powell overlooks Hylton by devoting his brief discussion of the Supreme Court of the 
1790s to an analysis of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which addressed 
the issue of “state amenability to suit in federal court.”  See Powell, supra note 18, at 921–
23.  Keith Whittington briefly notes other historical flaws in Powell’s analysis, while also 
providing a theoretical rationale for ignoring the intent of the Founders with regard to 
the use of original intent.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 315, at 180–82. 
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III.  NOT JUST A HORSE AND BUGGY ISSUE 
The taxation clauses are hardly the only place where the semantics 
“turn[] in a circle.”324  It may be the case that more originalist ink has been 
spilled on the Establishment Clause—“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”—than in any other area of 
constitutional interpretation.325  As one of us has recently written, 
commentators “have poured out thousands of heavily footnoted pages” on 
the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, and it “is not for lack of 
attention, then, that there are such enduring constitutional controversies 
over the meaning of fairly simple words such as ‘an’ and ‘respecting,’ a 
situation that hardly bodes well for our ability to resolve disputes over 
genuinely challenging concepts such as ‘establishment’ and ‘religion.’”326  A 
 
324 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176 (1796) (Paterson, J.) 
325 U.S. CONST. amend I; see also Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the 
Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 585 
(2006) (“No aspect of constitutional law has been dominated more by ‘originalism’ than 
First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”). 
326 DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 326 (2010).  For the 
dispute over the meaning of “an,” see, e.g., ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE:  HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 11 (1982) (arguing that the choice of 
“an” rather than “the” shows “the intent to prevent a single and not some pluralistic 
national religious establishment”); MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS:  THE 
INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14 (1978) (claiming that “by 
choosing ‘an establishment’ over ‘the establishment,’ [the Framers] were showing that 
they wanted to prohibit only those official activities that tended to promote the interests 
of one or another particular sect”).  On the opposite side, Douglas Laycock characterizes 
the Cord/Malbin interpretation as just “a figleaf of a textual argument” that is “wrong for 
at least four reasons.”  Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion:  A False Claim 
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 884 (1986).  As to the argument 
regarding ’respecting,’ see Leo Pfeffer, Church and State:  Something Less than Separation, 19 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1951) (arguing that the word “respecting” broadens the word 
“establishment” to include anything that might tend towards an establishment); see also 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“Not simply an 
established church, but any law respecting an establishment of religion is forbidden.  The 
Amendment was broadly but not loosely phrased.”).  Phillip Muñoz has pointed out that 
“[t]his interpretation of ‘respecting’ was subsequently instrumental to Chief Justice 
Burger’s majority opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).”  Muñoz, supra 
note 325, at 591 n.28.  A host of scholars disagree, pointing out that “respecting” conveys 
the “obvious meaning . . . then as now [of] ‘regarding,’ or ‘having to do with,’ or ‘in 
reference to’ such an establishment,” thus preventing the Congress from “interfering with 
established churches . . . at the state level.”  William C. Porth & Robert P. George, 
Trimming the Ivy:  A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 
109, 136–37 (1987); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996) (arguing that the Amendment’s language “also 
prohibited the national legislature from interfering with, or trying to disestablish, 
churches established by state and local governments.”); Muñoz, supra note 325, at 586, 
588 (concluding that Justice Thomas “most accurately captures the Establishment 
Clause’s original meaning” in describing it as a clause that “‘protects state establishments 
from federal interference but does not protect any individual right.’”) (quoting Elk Grove 
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brief review of one of those challenging concepts—an establishment of 
religion—will show that a New Originalist approach to the Establishment 
Clause will end up in the same kind of semantic circle that appeared in a 
study of the taxation clauses. 
If there is one thing upon which virtually all modern scholars in this 
contentious field can find agreement, it is that, at the time of ratification of 
the U.S. Constitution, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire had 
established churches.327  The details varied slightly, but the basic situation 
was the same in the three states:  each town collected taxes that would be 
used to fund a Protestant church in that town.  Members of other Protestant 
churches (but generally not Roman Catholics or those who belonged to no 
church) could sometimes obtain an exemption from these church taxes if 
they could show that they contributed to their own churches.328  These local 
church taxes were eliminated over the fifty-year period after the Constitution 
was adopted, a process almost universally described by modern scholars as 
“disestablishment.”329 
This system of ecclesiastical taxation would seem to be inarguably an 
“establishment of religion,” especially viewed from the vantage point of a 
modern era in which the challenging constitutional issues typically involve 
far fewer direct links between church and state than tax-funded churches, 
such as whether the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional.330  But a 
committed New Originalist would find even direct tax support of churches 
to be an excise-like semantic challenge.  Judicial decisions in the Founding 
 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)); Steven D. 
Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause:  A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843, 
1893 (2006) (arguing for the widespread acceptance of the jurisdictional interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause). 
327 As Gerard Bradley has pointed out, “[w]hen [modern] commentators and justices look 
for religious establishment at the time the Bill of Rights was enacted, they are not sure 
how many there were in America, but they are sure there were some in New England.”  
GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 20 (1987).  He cites 
numerous authorities who agree on this issue even while promoting a wide range of views 
on the proper separation of church and state, including Justice William Rehnquist’s 
dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); LEONARD W. LEVY, 
JUDGMENTS:  ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 169–218 (1972); LEO 
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 141 (1953). 
328 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:  RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1986); Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment:  The Church-State 
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385 (2004) (discussing the 
religious history of, and disestablishment in, America from the pre-colonial era to the 
mid-nineteenth century). 
329 LEVY, supra note 328; Esbeck, supra note 328. 
330 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2004) (holding a father 
had no standing to sue his daughter’s school district for requiring elementary school 
classes to recite daily the Pledge of Allegiance because relevant state law denies him the 
right to sue as next friend). 
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Era, for example, came to diametrically opposite conclusions.  Chief Justice 
Theophilus Parsons of Massachusetts proudly called his commonwealth’s 
system of church taxes an “establishment,”331 something he believed to be an 
essential bulwark of society.  Meanwhile, New Hampshire’s Chief Justice 
Jeremiah Smith opined that the Granite State’s virtually identical approach 
was not an establishment.332  For Justice Smith, “[a] religious 
establishment . . . is where the State prescribes a formulary of faith and 
worship for the rule and government of all the subjects.”333  Similarly, 
Connecticut’s Judge Zephaniah Swift rejected the “establishment” label,334 as 
did many of the supporters of the church taxes in New England, which they 
typically called the “Standing Order.”335  There was even a debate published 
in a Massachusetts newspaper between Baptist leader Isaac Backus and 
“Hieronymous” (most likely, the distinguished lawyer Robert Treat Paine) 
over whether Massachusetts had an establishment.  Backus, wrote 
Hieronymous, “displayed ‘his ignorance’ . . . in defining a religious 
establishment simply in terms of religious taxation.”336  Rather, Hieronymous 
argued, “[a] religious establishment by law is an establishment of a 
particular mode of worshipping God, with rites and ceremonies peculiar to 
 
331 Barnes v. Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401, 408 (1810); see also DRAKEMAN, supra note 326, at 220 
(describing the issue in Barnes v. Falmouth as “whether the minister of an unincorporated 
church (in this case a Universalist minister) could share in taxes raised under Article III” 
[of the Massachusetts Constitution]); THEOPHILUS PARSONS, JR., MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS 
PARSONS, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 201–03 
(1859) (offering Chief Justice Parsons’s lengthy encomium to establishments). 
332 See Muzzy v. Wilkins, 1 N.H. 1, 12 (1803) (holding that, because New Hampshire does not 
designate “a formulary of faith and worship for the rule and government of all the 
subjects,” no religious establishment has been prescribed); see also 2 WILLIAM G. 
MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT:  1630–1833:  THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION 
OF CHURCH AND STATE 863–70 (1971) (discussing the facts and holding in Muzzy).  
According to Justice Smith, there was no establishment, despite taxes supporting “public 
teachers of piety, religion, and morality,” because “[n]o one sect is invested with any 
political power much less with a monopoly of civil privileges and civil offices . . . . All 
denominations are equally under the protection of the law, [and] are equally the objects 
of its favor and regard.”  Id. at 864 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also CHARLES B. KINNEY, JR., CHURCH AND STATE:  THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SEPARATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1630–1900, 96 (1955) (presenting Chief Justice Jeremiah 
Smith’s summation of his interpretation of the Constitution in the Muzzy case). 
333 Muzzy, 1 N.H. at 12–13. 
334 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 322, at 923–24 (describing Swift’s view “that an establishment of 
religion was defined specifically in terms of a legally required uniformity and conformity 
of belief and practice”). 
335 See generally THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:  CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO 
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 98 (1986). 
336 1 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT:  1630–1833, at 615 (1971).  For a 
description of this debate in greater detail, see id. at 614–16.  See also Charles H. Lippy, 
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution:  Religious Establishment or Civil Religion?, 20 J. CHURCH 
& ST. 533 (1978) (discussing the intersection of public tax dollars and religion in Article 
III of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution). 
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such mode, from which the people are not suffered to vary.”337  In the end, 
according to historian William McLoughlin, “the definition of an 
‘establishment’ was not settled.  And it really did not matter.  For whether 
the New England system was an establishment or not, the Baptists opposed 
it.”338 
Once again, the New Originalist needs to make a definitional choice, 
and the objective evidence—all of it highly credible—points in two opposite 
directions.  For some, mandatory taxes collected for the support of a 
particular church constituted an “establishment” and, for others, they did 
not.  There is no particular reason for a New Originalist to choose one 
meaning of establishment over the other.  It is possible, however, to follow 
Justice Paterson’s method, and ask what the Framers were trying to 
accomplish in adopting the establishment clause.339  The answer to that 
question is unimportant for the purposes of this article, other than to say 
that there may well be such an answer,340 and that it could be used to resolve 
the textual impasse created by the contradictory evidence of actual usage.  
Here again, Originalism Classic can rescue New Originalism from its 
inability to select from competing and contradictory meanings. 
CONCLUSION:  ORIGINALISM OLD AND NEW 
The use of any version of originalism as a method of interpreting the 
Constitution has waxed and waned between 1787 and today, and this 
approach has lately received increasing levels of interest from legal scholars 
and the Supreme Court.  This growing enthusiasm has led to higher levels of 
intensity in the intellectual battles over just what it means to mean 
something.  Our goal here is not to settle those disputes once and for all, but 
to add a healthy dose of uncertainty to the mix.  New Originalists have 
offered the possibility of an objectively determined textual meaning 
 
337 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 336, at 614 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Recognizing 
this definitional ambiguity, John Adams wrote that the “laws of Massachusetts were the 
most mild and equitable establishment of religion that was known in the world, if indeed 
they could be called an establishment.”  CURRY, supra note 304, at 131 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  See generally John Witte, Jr., “A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of 
Religion”:  John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, in RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 
1 (James H. Hutson ed., 2000) (exploring Adams’s model of religious liberty and the text 
and formation Massachusetts Constitution). 
338 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 336, at 617.  A collection of the definitions of “establish” and 
“establishment” in a number of eighteenth-century English dictionaries can be found in 
JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE:  LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN 
TRADITION 185–86 (2006). 
339 Interested parties are encouraged to see how one of the authors has answered this 
question in DRAKEMAN, supra note 326. 
340 Id. at 326–34. 
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detached from difficult and messy questions about discerning the intentions 
of an amorphous group called the Framers.  We simply point out that the 
evidence of language use in the Founding Era can be just as messy, and may 
not always lead to a single “original meaning,” as defined by the New 
Originalists.  In those cases, we suggest that Justice Paterson may have had a 
good idea when he turned to the Old Originalism approach of asking what 
the Framers intended to accomplish when they adopted the constitutional 
language.  In the abstract, New Originalism may be supported by impressive 
theoretical arguments, but its appeal may be severely limited in cases where 
it must engage fairly with complex and inconsistent facts.  In those cases, we 
propose that there may be good cause to supplement the search for a single, 
objectively determined hypothetical ratifiers’ original meaning with 
Originalism Classic’s focus on what the Framers originally meant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
